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ABSTRACT

Traditionally, carriers flying the American flag
have concentrated on U.S. trades.

The advent of new

routing strategies in the container age has increas _
their ability to move cargo between foreign ports. As
a result, their dependence on these cargoes is growing.
An example is the "Sea Bridge" service, introduced by
United States Lines.

With a round-the-world itinerary,

this service may very well depend upon cargo carried
between foreign ports in order to succeed.
The ability of United States Lines to capture these
foreign-to-foreign cargoes may be hampered by rising
protectionism worldwide.

The analysis presented here

is in two separate disciplines.

The first section is an

analysIs of the political impediments to cargo access
United States Lines potentially faces with their new
service.

The second section is an economic analysis of

the service itself to determine its Viability.
The relevance of protectionism to the success of the
Sea Bridge service was then inferred by combining the two
sections.

It was established that protectionism was a

threat over the long term.

However, other factors, such

as the level of world trade, and the actions of competitors ,
would play a greater role in the success or failure of the
United States Lines service.
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CHAPTER ONE
GENERAL INFORMATION
Introduction

The introduction of fully cellular round-the-world
container shipping services (RWS) caused a great deal of
controversy and speculation in the maritime community. The
actions of United States Lines (U.S. Lines) and, the Taiwanese
carrier Evergreen Lines have the potential to seriously alter
the shape of liner shipping.

The systems created by theso

lines differ considerably; in that Evergreen appears to be
seeking the optimum ship routing configuration, wherp.as U.S.
Lines is introducing tremendous economies of
new buildings.

scal~

in their

The fact that the systems vary to' such

~

degree is an indication that no clear-cut formula exists for
success in RWS .

Although certain carriers, such as Neptune

Orient. are introducing RWS.
community is

rushin~

it does not appear tho Sllipping

into the commencement of their own RWS.

There are unique advantages Offered by RWS as compared
to point to point shuttle services; however, they must compete
in the same world marketplace . A major trend in this marketplace is protectionism.

In order to encourage their national

fleets, many nations practice cargo preferRnce and flag discrimination.

Prot~ctionism

in

1

shippin~

is not a new phenomenon,

dating back to the Roman Empire (Von Sydow, 1978).

Yet,

the emergence of the developing states in the past forty
years has increased the complexity of problems involved in
protectionism.

The idea of freely competitive cargo access

may be archaic in light of developments in the last decade.
Shipping nationalism appears to be gathering momentum, and
serious changes to the world trading system are inevitable.
However, the shipping industry does not easily lend itself to
rapid change; therefore, the introduction of legitimized protectionism should be considered evolutionary in nature.
In order for the RWS to be successful, the operators
must have access to crosstrade cargoes.

Crosstrade cargoes

are cargoes carried between two nations aboard a vessel that
flies a different flag from those ' of the trading nations.
focus here will be on the u.S. Lines service.

The

It is hypothe-

sized that the denial of access to crosstrade cargoes will be
a key element in the success or failure of the RWS.

An impor-

tant factor in keeping crosstrades open will be the response
of the United States Government to protectionist actions of
foreign governments and shipping interests.
This paper will attempt to measure the potential impacts
of protectionism upon the u.S. Lines RWS.

The very nature of

protectionism, as well as the fact that the RWS has yet to be
fully developed, places much of the subject matter in the realm
of speculation.

Both economic and political factors will be

2

subjected to analysis.

From the corobination of all the

considerations a conclusion will be established which will
determine whether the RWS is sufficiently marginal economically to

b~

rendered unprofitable by protectionist actions . .

An Overview of Maritime Economics

Maritime economics is a discipline which is associated
wi th the volatile field of world trade.

Shippinq is a "de-

rived industry, versus an industry which stands alone.

The

increasing politicization of world trade increases the complexity of maritime economics, as in excess of 99 percent of
world trade is seaborne.
The reasons for world trades, as Branch, 1982 discussed,
include:

1.

The uneven distribution of natural resources
worldwide.

2.

The effects of climate upon cultivation.

3.

The inability of certain nations to produce
i terns needed.

4.

The implication of "Comparative advantages",
that it is advantageous for nations to
specialize in the forms of production in
which they have superior production factors.

Benefits of trade include reduction in prices of certain
goods, greater product variety, and wider markets which. can
create economies of scale in production.

The idea of a world in which nations specialize in
producing those goods in which they are most·efficient, and
trade those goods for needed items, is clouded by political
considerations.

Governments have differing priorities, and

may divert from a free trade attitude because of security, or
internal economic conditions.

The emergence of the Third

World, since World War II, has caused a shift of world trades
toward developing countries.

The world shipping community has

followed this trend, and more ships are owned and operated by
developing nations.
Shipping is an "invisible" rather than "visible" factor
in world trade.

Visible factors are tangible qoods for which

costs are readily apparent.

Invisibles, such as shipping or

finance, can exert a great influence on the landed costs of a
commodity; thus deterrninina whether or not that commodity can
move in world trade (Juda, 1981).

Shipping also exerts a major

behind-the-scenes effect on the health of nations.

It has been

suggested that maritime economists evaluate the social costs of
shipping service to a nation, in addition to financial costs.
As an

invi~ible expen~e, ~hipping

can also effect a nation's

balance of payments with other countries.
provides employment opportunities.
in

wh~ch

The industry also

If a nation produces products

the comparative advantage is small, or the demand is

fairly elastic, the cost of shipping can influence that nationls
ability to sell its products in the world market.

Thus, invest-

ment in shipping may be warranted, although the service itself
may not be a profit maker.

4

Maritime transportation involves long-term investment
of substantial amounts of capital in a business which can be
altered by short-term political and economic events.

A ship-

owner must make judgements concerning the design of his vessel,
which may effect his operations ten to twenty years into the
future.

A general rule is that a shipowner seeks the slowest,

smallest vessel to do the job it is intended to do.

However,

a versatile vessel can be a hedge against short-term fluctuations in trades (Branch, 1982).
Vessels are designed for certain trades, but standardized
designs are accepted when the costs involved in designinq and
building th.e vessel become excessive.

The process involved in

weighing the myriad of factors involved and producing the perfect

~hip

for a trade is a science in itself, and a major subset

of maritime economics.
The ships themselves are merely vehicles in marine transportation.

Procurement of cargo is the primary consideration.

In order to effectively capture cargo, a shipowner must create
a schedule for his given on a given route.
Branch (1982) gives twenty factors to consider in planning
these schedules, includinq:

1.

Number of vessels employed.

2.

Types of vessels.

3.

Volume and type of cargo tLaffic.

4.

Seasonal traffic fluctuations.

5.

Availability of crews.

6.

Climatic conditions.
5

7.

Competition within a trade.

8.

Availability and reliability of labor and
port facilities.

9.

Time involved in cargo cperations.

10.

Voyage time between ports.

11.

Potential hostilities which may cause rerouting.

12.

Imbalances of trade flows.

13.

Potential traffic growth.

14.

Necessary time for dry docking and surveys.

15.

Fuel requirements.

Efficient ship scheduling requires continuous monitorinq
of market conditions and various costs involved in a trade.
A shipowner must also have plans for emergencies or changes
in a trade.
The four key elements of any shipping

1.

Speed of service.

2.

Frequency of service.

3.

Reliability of service.

4.

Cost of service

(Branc~,

o~eration

are:

1982).

It would appear that costs of service would predominate
over the other factors.
cases.

This is not necessarily true in all

The value of a commodity beinq shipped is a

sideration as to the service a shipper selectes.
high value

item~

pri~e

.con-

Shippers of

may place more emphasis on speed or frequency,

whereas shippers of lesser value items would tend to emphasize
6

cost of service.

This occurs for several reasons, hiqher

value items incur greater inventory costs, so a speedier
service may reduce these costs.

Shipping costs of low value

items are usually a greater percentage of the landed costs,
thus the emphasis would be towards a lower cost service.

De-

pendent upon his production schedule, a shipper will choose
the line which. offers a frequency of service which will best
suit his needs, whether it be weekly, bi-weekly, or monthly.
Reliability and reputation can also have a major impact on
the choice of a shipping operation.
All shipowners must contend with the same basic types of
operating expenses.

The percentage that each factor contri-

butes to overall operating costs can vary widely, depending
upon the type of shipping operation.

A common definition of

operating costs has yet to be established, and there is a
variety of different breakdowns (Heaver, 1985) which suit
different shipping operations.

The focus here will be on liner

operations, the cost structures of which

~ill

differ consider-

ably from those of bulk operations.
The first type of costs to be considered are voyage costs.
These ar e costs which. are incurred as a direct result of the
particular voyage being accounted for.

These costs are related

to the length of sea transit and the parti.cular ports called at.
Examples of voyage costs include expenses for fuel, port and
canal charges, and carao handling.
The next type of costs are those which can be considered
as unrelated to a particular voyage, but, vary little with
any particular route.

These costs include those for crew,

7

supplies, insurance, maintenance, and repairs, and administration.

Capital costs are those which are associated with.

the ownership of a vessel.
The definitions o f operating costs vary from one of the
total costs of the shipping operation to one where both
voyage costs and capital costs are deducted from total costs.
The latter is the most commonly used, and this provides for a
breakdown of total costs into operating, voyage and capital
costs (Heaver, 1985).
Another classification which. is used to di fferentiate
ship's costs is that between fixed and variable costs.

It

has been said that a troubled shipping line will continue to
operate as long as variable costs are covered, and some contribution can be made to fixed costs.

In a liner service such

as the Round-the-World Service (RWS) t.o be examined, many of
the costs which can be considered variable are indeed more of
a fixed nature which points to a serious flaw in this cos·t
differentiation.

For various reasons the breakdown used in

this analysis will be that given by Frankel (1982) which
utilizes the fixed/variable approach.

Chief among these rea-

sons is the fact that the service is' not fully developed and
changes could cause alteration of costs considered variable.
A secondary reason is the fact that capital costs will be on
the mind of the operator, as a tremendous debt burden
been incurred.

~as

Debt service may indeed have a major impact

on operating strategy, and thus, operating costs, nnd because
of this the separation between operating,
costs was not deemed necessary.
8

v~yage,

and capital

The following breakdown of operating expenses will be
used in this study (Frankel, 1982):

FIXED COSTS
1.

Financing.

2.

Crew and Manning.

3.

Insurance

4.

Administration.

5.

Overhead.

-

Hull, P

&

I.

VARIABLE COSTS
In Port
1.

Fuel and Lube Oil.

2.

Maintenance and Repair.

3.

Port Dues and Canal Costs.

4.

Supplies.

5.

Cargo Handling.

At Sea
1.

Fuel and Lube Oil.

2.

Maintenance and Repair.

3.

Supplies.
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Shipowners must also conform to standards set by
certain organizations which may effect the cost of operatinq
their vessels.

In the liner trades, shipowners form cartels

called conferences in which freight trades and sailing
schedules are regulated to benefit all members.

The Inter-

national Maritime Organization (IMO) sets standards for ship
construction.

The International Labor Organization (ILO)

sets standards for quality and care of shipboard personnel.
The field of maritime economics is broad, and the shipping
business is multi-faceted and dynamic.

The efficient ship-

owner must have a firm grasp of all factors which could effect
his operations.

Considering the international nature :o f the

business, events thousands of miles away can make or break a
shipping operation.

National po:icies and conference practices

can also determine the success or failure of a service.
in ship design, scheduling, or marketing could

Errors

po~entially

cause a shipping line to lose profitability.

The Development of Containerization

Liner shipping is performed for the carriaqe of mostly
high value., finished goods.

This can be differentiated from

bulk shipping, in which shipload lots of homogenous, lower
value cargo is carried.
Liner services require an extensive sh.oreside support
staff, and provide 's h i p p e r s with regularly scheduled sailings
at frequent intervals.

A major economic element in liner

shipping is termed "cross subsidization".
,"

As freight rates

are a proportion of the landed cost of an item in international trade, the rate would naturally be a higher proportion
of the cost of a low valued item versus a higher valued item
over the same trade route.

As a result, shipowners charge

"what the traffic can bear", with higher valued items charged
a higher rate.
In effect, the high value items subsidize the movement
of low value items in order to keep the low value items flowincr.
This results in higher load factors
utilization).

(pe~centage

of vessel

Shipowners involved in multiple trade routes

also cross-subsidize lower revenue earning routes with profits
earned from higher revenue routes.
Liner shipping waS revolutionized in the late 1950s,
with the advent of containerization.

Prior to containerizat.i.on,

goods were carried in small lots which were care tully stowed in
holds of ships by longshoremen.
both labor and time intense.

This method (break-bulk) was

Ships spent up to 60 percent of

their lives in port (Goss, 1967).
The maximum size of vessels using the break-bulk method
was governed by the need to reduce the turn-around time as
much as pos:ible.
port.

Ships do not earn revenues while sitting in

A smaller vessel is able to turn-around in port much

faster than a larger vessel.

Economies of scale were overcome

by the need to reduce the turn-around time.
In

t.

he late 1950s an American trucking magnate, Malcolm

McLean established a liner shipping service between New York
and Texas which proved to be a model for
tion network.

2.

wo r Ld:..ci.de

transporta-

McLean stowed cargo in boxes which fit onto truck
11

trailers.

Their easy removal allowed cargo to be carried at

sea, or on land without bulk breakage.

Since the loads were

of homogenous size, loading and offloading was facilitated.
The larger weight per lift enabled container vessels to
drastically reduce their turn-around time in port, enabling
larger ships to be economically employed.

Any additional fuel

costs incurred by the higher operating speeds were justified
by the increased efficiency of port operations.
Containerization requires large amounts of capital input,
which is a main reason for shipowners in liner shipping not
immediately embracing it.

To combat this capital intensive-

ness, shipowners formed consortia to divide the costs

amon~

several countries/companies.
The Atlantic Container Line CACL) was formed in 1967 with
Swedish, Dutch, French and English partners.

This consortium

was formed in direct response to the introduction of containerized
service on the North Atlantic route in 1966 by the three American
lines of Moore McCormack, U.S. Lines, and Sea-Land (Kendall, 1983).
The first containerships were break-bulk vessels which had
been converted to carry containers on deck.

As containerization

became more widely accepted, purpose-built containerships were
constructed.

These vessels feature cellular guides to place the

containers in, and facilities to securely store the containers.
In order to utilize economies of scale, these vessels were
larger and faster than break-bulk vessels.

The oil crisis of

1973 caused shipowners to examine fuel costs.

Reduced speeds and

replacement of stearn turbines with diesels increased fuel
efficiency.

, ...

Ships such as the 26 knot, Sea Land SL-7, became too
costly to operate efficiently.

The subsidized

u.s.

carriers

were handicapped by this conversion to diesel, as the U.S.
Navy required a certain design speed be incorporated into subsidized vessels.

As a result, American operators were placed

at a disadvantage, as compared to their European and Japanese
counterparts.
Containerization has manifested itself in other ways.
Besides the growth in number and size of full containerships,
additional innovations included the semi-containership, the
roll-on/roll-off, and the container/bulk ship.
The semi-container ship is designed to carry break-bulk
as well as container cargo.

The roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO)

carries

the container, as well as the chassis, and features faster unloading than the full containerships.

The container/bulk ships

are full containerships with strengthened hulls, allowing the
carriage of bulk cargoes.
There are also hybrid combinations of these basic types,
and other carriers which compete with full containerships for
cargo.

The percentage of these types of vessels is growing

annually.
In 1981, the percentage of world containership fleet for
these basic types totalled 56 percent (CSR, 1984), and consisted
of:

1.

Semi-container

32 percent

2.

Roll-on/roll-off

18 percent

3.

Container/bulk

6 percent
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In addition to other types of vessels, full containership
operators must compete 'with land modes of transportation due to
the intermodal nature of containerization.
The Trans-Siberian Railroad offers competition in the
Europe/Far East trade, and has captured an estimated 20 percent
of cargoes flowing from the Far East to Europe (Seatrade,
1985 bl.

Landbridge operationsfrom the Far East to Europe and

the East Coast of

Nort~

America '

(and vice-a-versa) have secured

a market share competing with all-water carriers.
World containerized traffic increased over 600 percent between 1970 and 1982 (CSR, 1984).

This growth was primarily re-

corded on three major trade routes:

1.

North, Atlantic/Europe

2.

Europe/Far East

3.

North America/Far East

Given its capital intensiveness, many third world trades
were not balanced or large enough to warrant containerization.
Many of these trades are now in the process of being containerized.
One manifestation of the capital intensiveness of containerization was the concentration of vessels among a few carriers.
In 1980, twenty carriers owned 60 percent of the world fleet.

In

1981, 73 percent of the total slot capacity could be attributed
to carriers from Western Europe, Far East and North America (Pearson and Fossey, 1984).
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Regardless of the fact that certain developing nations
have recorded increases in containerized traffic, the main
impetus for container growth has remained with developed and
emerging developed nations.

Considering the current surplus

of vessels, and the ability to lease containers, the capital
intensiveness of containerized shipping is decreasing, and
market entry has been facilitated.

This will lead to major

changes in the geographic distribution of containerized traffic,
as well as ownership of the world's container fleet (Pearson and
Possey, 1984).

Despite the aforementioned financial restrictions

placed upon containership operations, the world market is currently overtonnaged, especially in the North/North trades.
Containerization International Yearbook 1984 places the
world fleet at 2,961 ships with a capacity of 1.75 million TEU.
Ships on order aggregated another 330,000 TEU, to be delivered
by 1986.

These new slots will aggravate a market already over-

tonnaged by up to 30 percent.
higher; one estimate as

muc~

Other forecasts are considerably
as 2.4 million TEU by 1986 (CSR,

1984).
Nearly one third of the TEU slots on order in 1984 were
the result of orders by two operators, the American carrier
u.S. Lines, and the Taiwanese carrier Evergreen Lines.

In a

time when there is existing overcapacity, and the growth of manufactured goods is expected to increase only 4.6 percent per annum,
one can only wonder where the cargo to fill these massive orders
will come from (Containerization International, 1985) .
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Protectionism in Shipping

It has been stated that the "megatrend" in international maritime policy is the politicization of formerly
private decisions and commercial accomodations (Schrier, 1985).
This politicization can take many forms, and there seems to be
no common definition· of protectionism which is accepted on a
global basis.

The driving forces behind this wave of pro-

tectionist actions in the maritime world are the general recession worldwide, and the desire of many nations to establish
or expand their merchant fleets

(Totland, 1980).

Protectionism can be broadly defined as reduction- of
competition through non-market forces to favor national interests.
Protectionism can be categorized into three general categories:

1.

unilateral cargo reservation and flag preference

2.

bilateral division and allocation of cargo

3.

multilateral cargo sharing schemes

Many nations, including the United States, practice cargo
reservation of government-impelled cargoes.

Bilateral agree-

ments between nations are proliferatinq worldwide, whether they
are governmental or commercial in nature.

An example of a nulti-

lateral sharing scheme is the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNC'!'AD) Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences
which came into force in October of 1983.
The UNCTAD Liner Code evolved from the desire of developing
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countries to form a "New International Maritime Order" (Bohme,

19841.

Developing nations sought to:

1.

Kave a substantial and increased share in the
carriage of oceanborne cargoes and a corresponding
portion of the world fleet.

2.

Form their national fleets on the grounds of sound
economic principles and equity.

In 1970, the developing nations accounted for approximately

17 percent of world trade, but, only slightly more th.an 6 percent
of world tonnage (UNCTAD, 1982).

Besides the ineqity in the num-

ber of vessels, the developing nations were hampered by the
difficulties experienced in gaining entry into closed liner
conferences serving their trades (Juda, 1981).

Liner conferences

are defined as organizations of international liner carriers
that collectively agree on routes, schedules, rates, and other
aspects of liner services (Office of Technology Assessment, 1983).
Since conferences were in existence prior to the emergence of
the Third World, they were viewed as a vestige of colonialism.
Developing countries also felt they had no control over freight
costs, and their inability to ensure cargoes made financing a
fleet a difficult proposition (Juda, 1981 ).

In response to these

difficulties, the United Nations Conference on Trade and

Develo~-

ment (UNCTAD) adopted a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences
in 1974.

Basic provisions of the UNCTAD Code include:

1.

The right of national flag lines to enter
conferences serving their trades.
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2.

Cargo sharing through tonnage/revenue
pooling, or sailing agreements.

3.

Dispute resolution mechanisms.

4.

Conference decision making and consultation.

5.

Freight rate determination.

6.

Procedures for grant of membership.

The focus here will be on Article 2.4 of the Code which
states:

a)

The national flag lines in ~ trade shall each
carry an equal proportion of their mutual
conference trade.

b)

Third-country shipping lines shall have the
right to acquire a significant part such as
20 percent in the freight and volume of. traffic
generated in that trade.

These provisions have become known widely as the 40-40-20
clause, the numbers representing the respective shares of a
trade given to the national flag lines in a trade and thirdflag carriers, which are named crosstraders.
By January, 1984, fifty-nine nations had ratified the Code.
The European Economic Community (EEC) has become signatory to
the Code with a set of reservations dubbed the "Brussels Package"
(EEC Regulation 954/79), which exempts cargo carried between
EEC members, and also between reciprocating members of the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
from the cargo sharing provisions of the Code.

It is postulated

that the combination of viable nonconference carriers and the
Brussels Package has left only 5 to 10 percent of the world's
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liner cargo under the auspices of the Code (Odeke, 1984).
Many nations nave been disinclined to make the Code operative.
Other~problems

which implementation of the Code faces include:

1.

Non-acceptance by major trading nations,
such as the United States, Australia and
Brazil.

2.

Lack of provisions for administration.

3.

The questionable legal status of Conferences
if governments police the Code (Sturmey, 1984).

4.

Questions of status of transshipment cargo, as
well as undirectional servic€s such as Roundthe-World Service (Frankel, et aI, 1981).

5.

If developing nations take measure more restrictive than the Code, such as applying it
to all liner cargo, (excluding independents),
or bulk cargoes, it will tend to make the Code
irrelevant dependent upon the interpretation
of the Code (Odeke, 1984).

Comments on the Code in the developed countries have
ranged from "a license for protectionism" to "aodifying the
best conference principle" (Schrier, 1985 and Sturmey, 1984).
Such polarization will lead to problems in implementation, but
the Code will not just go away.

It has legitimized existing

political impediments, and it will change the traditional conference structures to a yet to be seen form, .i.f it is implemented.
The vexing problem of the role of government regulation under
the Code will undermine its implementation in its present form.
One of the strengths of the Code is that it can be radically
altered after five years, which will occur in 1988.

The Code

will have to deal with current practices of certain nations,
which are either different from, or in opposition to, the provisions and spirit of the Code.
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Another issue which must be

dealt with is the fact that conference practice has changed
since the Code was drafted, therefore, the Code will have to
be changed to reflect cur

n t conference practice (Container-

ization International Yearbook, 1984).

The review conference

in 1998 may well determine whether or not an international
instrument, such as the Code, will ha ve much relevance in

he

future of liner shipping.
Another form of political impediment

s unilateral

protectionist actions taken by gove :nments to aid the ir
al fleets.

nat~on-

These include:

1.

Cargo preferenc of certain commodities or
government impe lled cargoes.

2.

Flag preference again

3.

foreign vessels

a.

currency exchange control

b.

preferential c lauses in : r a d e agr

c.

import and export licensinq syste

d.

port regulations and berth prefe r

e.

taxation measures.

e.

_ .3

ce

Other practices incl ude:
a.

heavy fines for minor offenses

b.

imposition of heavy port dues in response
to freight increases

c.

discrimination against non-national, multimodal operators

d.

r =f u s a l of transshipment

e.

requiring lines to obtain
status'

f.

discriminatory government purchasing (OECD,
1983) .

"associat~

line

If a multilateral or bilateral scheme is not adopted
by the nations in a trade, especially trades between developed
and developing nations (LDCs), it seems almost certain that
these LDCs would impose any measures needed to ensure the
growth or development of their merchant fleets; if they were
indeed intent on developing a national shippinq industry.

The

danger to world shipping would seem to be greater if each of a
multitude of nations were given free rein to impose

an~

of a

long list of impediments to foreign flag carriers.
Of increasing importance are commercial impediments;
those which appear to be

comn~erclal

in nature.

The distinction

between commercial and government impediments is becoming
increasingly blurred (American Shipper, 1985).

Commercial pro-

tectionism includes:

1.

Shipping associations which favor national
carriers.

2.

The requirement of certain governments to
hire local agents, and pay them a minimum
commission.

3.

Cargo booking offices and freight bureaus
which favor national carriers.

4.

Agreements between national shipping lines,
which lock up mutual trade between two nations.

5.

Closed conferences which exclude outsiders.

6.

Other impediments such as letters of credit
which specify certain lines, increased paperwork, burden on non-national carriers, etc.
(Manalytics, 1984, Vol. 3).
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Most commercial impediments can be seen as a replacement
for direct Government impediments, as the Government plays a
major role in the conduct of nations practicing these impediments (Manalytics, 1984, Vol. 3).
The final type of impediments which a crosstrader may
face is bilateral agreements.

These agreements can serve to

lock up cargo between two nations, or group of nations, so
that a third flag line is effectively blocked.

Many of the

agreements in force are 50/50, with each principal carrying
50 percent of their.mutual trade.
al actions, and do

no~

Since these are government-

lie within the conference structure,

a third flag line can only appeal to its own government when
blocked from a trade.

Given the imbalanced nature of many

trades, and the flexibility of multi-national port calls at
each end of given trade routes, it has been stated that multilateralism is preferable to bilateralism in many cases, as the
latter may cause routing efficiences.

The UNCTAD Code provides

for regional cargo-sharing schemes.
Cargo-sharing, as a whole, may lead to increased participation of Governments, due to the need to regulate cargosharing pools (Sturmey, 1984).

Totland (1980) has stated that

cargo preference will result in lack of innovation, and increased freight rates in the long run.
Protectionism is on the rise, and nations espousing freetrade, such as the United States, must 'd e ve l o p policy responses
to combat this growing trend, integrating national security,
foreign relations, and domestic aspects.
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Development of U.S. Maritime Policy
The Shipping Act of 1916 marked the commencement of
U.S. Government regulation of the liner shipping industry.
The Act created the U.S. Shipping Board, investing in the
Board the duty of encouraging the U.S. flag merchant marine.
The Act made certain practices illegal, such as the use of
"fighting ships" and deferred rebates by liner conferences.
Discrimination against American shippers was also made
illegal.

Section 14(a) of the Act (46 U.S.C. 813)

~ave

the

Board the power to retaliate against foreign nationals found
in violation of the Act.

The prescribed penalty for foreign

nationals in violation of the Act was to deny their vessels
entrance to U.S. ports (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983).
During the course of World War I, the U.S. merchant
marine grew from a nominal to a huge fleet of over 1,750 ships.
The principle objectives of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920
were the disposition of this fleet, and to expand the function
of the Shipping Board (Frankel, 1982).
was to create rules and regulations,

This expanded function

in addition to enforcing

existing laws.
Section 19(b)(46 U.S.C. 876) of the Act reads as follows:
The Board is authorized to make rules affecting
shipping in the foreign trades, not in conflict
with law and order, to adjust or meet general or
special conditions unfavorable to shipping in the
foreign trade.
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Conditions warranting a Section 19 ,proceeding are any
foreign laws, regulations or anticompetitive methods employed
by foreign nationals which discriminate against carriers in
u.S. trade.

The law also gave the Board the right to request

other government agencies to change or revise rules affecting
shipping, and a Presidential review, if conflicts arose in
that context (u.S. Government Printing Office, 1983).
Both the 1916 Shipping Act and the 1920 Merchant Marine
Act enunciated the need for a merchant marine.

The Merchant

Marine Act of 1936 went further than the previous acts, specifying how the merchant marine would be promoted.
The Act introduced the essential trade route and subsidy
systems which would form the cornerstone of U.S. promotional
policies.

The U.S. Shipping Act Board was abolished and re-

placed with the U.S. Maritime Commission.

The Commission was

charged with promotional programs, as well as the regulatory
functions of the Shipping

Bo~rd.

In addition to the powers granted in Section 14 of the
1916 Act, and Section 19 of the 1920 Act, the Commission was
directed to investigate any discriminatory actions in foreign
trade, and recommend legislation to correct the situation under
46 U.S.C. 1122 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983).
The U.S. Maritime Commission was in existence throughout
World War II, which saw a rapid growth of the U.S. Merchant
Marine.

Under Reorganization Plan 21

(75 STAT. 203) of 1950,

the U.S. Maritime Commission was abolished and replaced by the
Federal Maritime Board in the Department of Commerce (U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1983).

In 1961, the Federal Maritime Board was abolished in
Reorganization Plan 7 (75 Stat. 840) '. The r egu l a to ry functions
of the Board were transferred to the Federal Maritime Commission
(FMC), an independent regulatory agency.

The Commission consists

of five commissioners, who are appointed by the President; and a
Chairman , who is appointed from one of the five commissioners
(U .S. Government Printing Office, 1983).
The FMC inherited Section 14 and Section 19 powers to protect
carriers in the U.S. trades.

As U.S. carriers adopted new routing

strategies (given containerization), more opportunities for crosstrading were created.

The question arose as to the applicability

of Section 19 and Section 14 to non-U.S. trades (Senate Report

~8-J).

Section 19 is applicable "in the foreign trade", but is silent as
to trades between foreign ports (U.S. Government Printing Office ,
1983) .
Section 14 is applicable in the foreign to foreign trades;
however,

it has the stipulation that the foreign nationals have

committed one of a list of prohibited acts (Senate Report

~8-3) .

This did not give the FMC much leeway in the event impediments
existed, yet did not fall within the range of prohibited acts.
In hearings before the House

~erchant

Karine and Fisheries

Committee on the Shipping Act of 1983 (H.R. 1878), Albert

~ay,

Vice President of the Council of American Flag Ship Operators,
(CASO) requested an amendment to the bill authorizing the

F~C

to suspend tarriffs of foreign carriers unduly impairing access
of a U.S. carrier trade between foreign ports (House of Representatives Hearings, March, 1983).
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I n a 1 cture at t e U

_ v er s~ t y

f Rhode Island, Gerald

Siefe r . , Counsel of ch e 10 se Merch .nt Marine and Fisheries
Committee, stated that in response to requests by United
States Diplomats negotiating with Consultative Shipping Group
(C.S . . ), Article 13(b)(5) was added to bill H.R. 1878, wh~ch
eventually became the Shipping Act of 1984.
The C.S.G. is composed of European and Japanese

interests.

Talks have centered on the C.S.G. adoption of the UNCTAD Liner
Code, as well as United States access to closed ccnferences in
European and Japanese trades.

As it echoes of retaliation for

any acts Which 9r e v e n t U.S. carriers from crosstrading, it was
felt that Article 13(b)(5) would provide the Un i t e d States wi th
a stronger position in these talks.

Article 13(b)(5) of the

Shipping Act of 1984 reads:

If, after notice and hearing, the Commission
finds that the action of a common carrier,
acting alone or in concert with any person,
or a foreign government. has unduly impaired
access of a vessel documented under the laws
of the United States to t r a d e between forei~n
ports, the Commission shall take action a " it
finds appropriate. " , (98 Stat. 83, Section"
13(b)(5).

Appropriate

ac~ion

includes the suspension of tariffs

which are req uired for a foreign operator to operate in U.S .
trade.

If the foreign carrier wishes to continue working in

the United States cr a d e s , it is necessary to file new tariffs
naming o n l y home ports.

This effectively bars foreign

from crosstrading in the U.S. trades.
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carr~ers

Article 1 3 (b ) (5' has been termed a reactive rather
than active response, whereby impediments to u.s. crosstrading would be met by the termination of crosstrading
opportunities in u.s. trades (Schrier, 1984).
The final rules implementing Article 13(b)(5). state
conditions for "unduly impaired" are found only where a
u.S. flag carrier is commercially able to enter a trade.
Conditions in which a judgement of "unduly impaired access"
is required include:

1.

Imposition upon u.S. flag vessels or
shippers of fees, charges, or restrictions
different from those iMposed upon national
flag carriers or other carriers.

2.

Reservation of a subs ~antial pc~:ion of
the total cargo in a trade to national flag,
or other lines, without providing u.S. flag
carriers competitive access.

3.

Use of predatory practices including closed
conferences employing fighting shi :.'S or deferred rebates.

4.

Any other Government or coromerc al action
which unduly impairs access to ~ o s s ~=a de
cargoes (U.S. Government Printing Of ~ice, 1984).

When a u.S. flag carrier has exhausted all commercial
remedies available, a petition can be filed with the Federal
Maritime Commission (FMC)

under Section 13.

If the FMC finds

indications of conditions unduly impairing access to crosstrade cargoes, a proceeding will be instituted; with the
commencement published in the Federal Register.

After gathering information from all interested parties,
the FMC may conduct hearings before rendering judgment .

If

the judgment affirms the petition of the affected carrier,
the FMC is directed

~o

notify the Secretary of

Stat~;

request-

ing that the State Department resolve the matter through diplomatic channels.

If not accomplished within a specified period

of time, the FMC may order sanctions against foreign carriers,
or any national flag line, of the nation responsible for the
impediment.

These sanctions include:

1.

Imposition of equalizing fees or charges.

2.

Cargo limitations on cargo carried to, or
sailing from U.S. ports.

3.

Tariff suspension, with fines up to $30,~00
per shipment for violation of suspensions.

4.

Any other action the Commission considers
appropriate.

Notice of the decision is then published in the Federal
Register; and, si.nultaneous:y, is submitted to the President,
for approval.

Within ten days, the President may disaprove

the action because of national security or considerations of
foreign policy.

Thus, the machinery is in place for the

United States to respond to political and commercial impediments,
thereby preserving the crosstrading rights of U.S . carriers.
Section 13(b)(5) will be an effective deterrent to
impediments of nations which are major crosstraders in our
trades.

However, Section 13 is just one ot many potential
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? o l i c y responses to protectioaist actions of foreign nations.
Should responses in the maritime sector fail to produce the
desired results, non-maritime policy responses may be invoked
Pos

ble Governmental responses to political impediments are:

1.

Formal protest.

2.

Tariff suspension under Section 13(b)(5}.

3.

Port closure under Section 14(a)(2) of the
Shipping Act of 1916.

4.

Cargo reservation by executive order.

5.

Imposition of operating restrictions.

6.

Increased taxes or currency control by
executive order.

n maritime responses which can be invoked' include:

1.

increased duties (Tariff Act of 1930),

2.

trade restrictions (various Acts).

3.

alteration of economic or military aid.

4.

abrogation of treaties (Manalytics, 1984).

The enforcers of U.S. maritime policy have considerable
clout and many tools to work

wit~.

However, they are handi-

capped by the fact that shipping is a small part of the total
economic and geopolitical considerations in U.S. foreign
economic and commercial policy.
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In view of that. it

i~

evident that, when sanctions are being considered, a host
of other government agencies will be involved in the process
of making decisions.
foreign nation

o~

Many will have vested interestsin the

nations involved.

Opposition by one or

more of these agencies may handcuff the TI1C in its ability
to keep crosstrades open.
Other major

actors in the foreign policy process are:

1.

Department of State.

2.

Department of Defense.

3.

Department of Transportation.

4.

Department of Agriculture.

5.

Department of Commerce.

6.

Export-Import Bank.

7.

Office of the Trade Representative.

8.

Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

9.

International
Agency.

10.

Deve~opment

and Cooperation

Agency for International Development.

As evidenced in the

informatio~

provided above , the FMC

will have to exert considerable influence on the domestic front,
before any influence is 'e x e r t e d in the international sphere.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE ROUND-THE-WORLD SERVICE
Developing the Service
united States Lines is probably best remembered for
their passenger ship operations which included the superliner S.S. United States, holder of the blue ribband for
fastest transatlantic crossing.

United States Lines was

also a pioneer in the transatlantic container trade, commencing the carriage of containers on the deck of four
br.eakbulk vessels in March 1966 (Kendall, 1983).
In 1974, United States Lines was purchased by

~alcolm

McLean, pioneer of containerization and founder of Sea-Land
Corporation.

McLean inherited a fleet of vessels which were

too small for the routes· they were involved in, as well as
being fuel-inefficient steam-turbine vessels.

High manning

scales also caused the line's inability to compete with
foreign operators and more efficient American operators.
McLean had an idea to revolutionize the container business by introducing greater economies of scale than those
being used.

The theoretical maximum size of a container

vessel was considered in the range of 5,000 TEU.

However,

in 1978, the average size of fully cellular container vessels
was 842 TEU (Pearson and Fossey, 1984).
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McLean employed C. R. Cushing Company to design
panamax,

(~aximum

dimensions to fit through the Panama

Canal) containerships to run in an around-the-world
itinerary.
size~

At the time, containerships were growing in

the Hapag Lloyd vessel, Frankfurt Express, held the

lead with 3,045 TEU (American Bureau of Shipping, 1984).
McLean's idea went beyond that, and plans were drawn for
a 4,400 TEU vessel.
The proposed itinerary for this fleet of superships
was also a first in container circles.

The idea of. an

around-the-world service was not a new one.

Several lines,

notably American Export Lines, ran break-bulk vessels
around the world successfully.

Barber Blue Sea and several

other operators ran semi-container and roll-on/roll-of£ (RO/RO)
operations worldwide.

Never before had anyone run a fully

cellular container vessel on a worldwide itinerary.
Before his dream would come to fruition, McLean would
face many obstacles, the first of which was the Maritime
Administration U1ARAD).

In order to initiate the new service

it was necessary to buyout of the operating differential subsidy to enable the line to charter foreign flaq feeder services.
It is stated in Section 804(A) of the Merchant Marine Act of.
t

1936 that it is illegal for a subsidized u.S. carrier to operate
or charter foreign flag tonnage which competes with any essential u.S. flag service (Government P'ri.rrt Ln-; Office, 1983).

32

The money obtained from the buyout also assisted
in McLean's financing of his new vessels.

In June 1982,

MARAD approved the buyout of a U.S. Lines

lon~-term

sub-

sidy, in return for a cash settlement and a five year shortterm subsidy on vessels not involved in Round-the-World
Services (RWS).

In October 1984,

~ARAD approv~d

the request

for foreign feeder vessels for a period of two years.

Both

the subsidy buyout and the foreign flag feeders are being
challenged by various United States maritime interests on
the grounds that the MARAD decisions will adversely affect
their interests (Seatrade,1985a)-.
Another obstacle McLean faced was gaining
to build his ships abroad.

peL~ission

Permission was "received in 1983,

as the Government granted a twelve month waiver for United
States-flag

subsi~ized

carriers to build their vessels abroad.

An order was placed with Daewoo Shipyard in South Korea for
twelve

"Econships"

(named by the designer) which U.S. Lines

will call the "New York Class".
The $570 million contract was the larqest shipbuilding
order in history.

In order to finance this staqqering amount,

McLean obtained 80 percent of the required financing from the
shipyard over a ten year reriod.
.~erican

Other lenders, most notably

Express and General Electric, provided fundinq for

down payments over a twelve year period.

U.S. Lines established

a $10 million account for each ship and agreed to maintain
certain financial obligations (American Shipper,. 1984) .
During this

sa~e

period of time, in addition to developing his
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RWS, McLean made two other major acquisitions.

In January

1983, U.S. Lines acquired Moore McCormack, operating thirteen
vessels running to the East Coast of South America.

Moore

McCormack was renamed U.S. Lines S.A., and in late 1984,
Delta Steamship Lines was acquired.

Delta Lines ran eleven

vessels operating in the East and West Coasts of South
American and South African trades.

Pz e s urnc..b Ly , once South

American trades have been containerized, cargo will be fed
into the RWS at Panama.
In mid-1984, the first vessel, "American New York"
launched.

~as

This initiated the larqest peacetime expansion of

the U.S. Merchant Marine in United States history.

U.S. Lines

Chairman, William Bru, called it a "new era in American shipping".

If succp.ssful, this new service, along with another

RWS initiated by Evergreen Lines of Taiwan, could upset
traditional notions of maritime economics, and force the
departure of many inefficient lines from the world shipping
communi ty (Sagar, 1985).

The Econships
Malcolm McLean souqht to expand his oriqinal idea,
which had taken the world bv storm.

Containerships continued

to make multi-port calls at each end of a trade route, rather
than only servicing major ports.
serviced by mainline vessels.
not

occure~

Secondary ports were still

The idea of "load centers" had

for several reasons.

McLean's idea was to intro-

duce the largest ships with economical power plants and reduced manning to run "the cheapest container slot".
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McLean presented his idea to C. R. Cushing Company
of New York, and plans were made for the Econships.

The

size of the vessels was constrained by the size of the
Panama Canal.

They are nine hundred fifty feet in overall

length, with. a beam of one hundred six feet, and a summer
draft of thirty five feet.

They are rated at 4,200 TEU,

however, on her maiden voyage the American New York carried
4,400 TEU.

Figure 1 shows the dimensions and capacities of

the Econships·.
The ve s se Ls are virtually rectangular above the waterline.

Below the waterline they are fine to allow greater

fuel economy.
ships.

The beam is the same at the stern as to mid-

The seventy foot depth gives the vessel a very high

freeboard.

Other features built into the vessel are lack of

flared bow and minimum dead rise from the keel to the bilge
stroke.

This minimizes dry-docking and repair complications.

The ratio of length to beam is nine to one, compared to
an average ratio for most panamax vessels of approximately
seven to one.

There are two large box girders running the

length of the vessel, which allow increased lonqtitudinal
strength and provide the crew with access to the bow by acting
as rassageways.
Econships are powered by a Sulzer two-stroke diesel
producing 28,000 horsepower and driving a 7.6 meter diameter
five-bladed propeller.

Service speed of these vessels is

eighteen knots, and they are expected to burn approximately
seventy three tons of fuel per day.

The fuel capacity is

fifty six hundred tons enabling the vessels to circle the
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FIGURE 1

The "NEW YORK CLASS" Full Container Ships
Christening May 31. 1984

•

American New York
American Maine
Outline of v

•

:

American New Jersey
American Alabama

These v
are singl. screw, singl. rudder, dl....prop.lled with fcl. deck and bulbou. bow. Th. engine room and
accommOdations are located aft. Th. design is principally tor carrying ISO type. torty-toot long. cargo containers.

Prtnet. . Partlcutars:
...... DIIMMIon.:

a)

Length overall:
Beam (Panamax):
DeQth:
Draft:

b)

Dadweight and

289.500 M/950 ft.
32.218 M/ 10e ft.
21.500 M/ 70' 8"
10.870 M/ 35 ft.
Tonn~:

DWT at scantling draft
Gross tonnage
Net ton nag.
C)

57.800 metric tons
52.000 memc ton.
18.700 metric tons

C~

eom.t....:

in hold.
1232 FEU (torty-toot equival.nt units)
on deck. 996 FEU
2228 FEU
Total
Includ. capacity tor 146 FEU refrigerated units on deck.
Sr• •bulk capacity: 102,500 cu ft.
Particularly suitabl. for heavy lift roiling stock.

d)

Speed -Crut.tng Range:
These vessels will carry sufficient fu.1 to cruise 30.000 nautical mil.s at 18 knots.

e)

Main engine:
MOdel Sulzer 7RLB90, Slow speed diesel
Horsepower: 28.000

f)

S41fety F••turn:
•
•
•
•

g)

Contam.rs are secured by " Pec k and Hale", ridged rod With locking stacker lashing system.
Longsnoreman catwalks provided throughout the structure.
U.S. Coast Guard Safety Regulations applicable.
Class: ABS. + A1 ,~+ AMS. + ACCU.

GuJdancel Nnigatloftl Communication Equtpment
•
•
•
•
•

SATNAV Satelite guidance system .
Loran/Decca electronic navigation syst.m.
Sperry autopilot SAP 2000-Steering control and autopilot. and hydraulic backup syst.ms.
Sperry radar plant (Short and long range) including collision avoidance systems.
Satellite communication system allOWing contact by telex or vOIce to any office or ship in the world.

Source:

MARAn
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globe without bunkering (Marine Engineering Log, 1984).
Tw~~ty

cne crewmen operate the vessels, including:

1.

One Master.

2.

Three Deck Officers.

3.

Chief Engineer and Three Assistant Engineers.

4.

One Radio Officer.

5.

Six Seamen.

6.

Two Engine

7.

One Wiper.

8.

Three Stewards.

~echanics.

This represents a considerable reduction in crew over
former u.S. Lines vessels which carried a crew of thirty nine.
The vessels are American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) classified,
and represent the state of the art in containership design
(American Bureau of Shipping, 1984).

The Route
u.S. Lines has been extremely secretive in the development of the

~Sea Bridge~

service.

A proposed itinerary is

presented in Table 1, along with distances and transit times.
Figure 2 shows the route on a world map.
feeder service distances.

Table 2 depicts the

The service began in December 1984.

The interim service deletes the Northern Europe port as well
as port calls in the Persian Gulf, and Balboa, Panama.
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Table 1

ROUND-THE-WORLD SERVICES
DISTANCE AND TRANSIT TIMES

DISTANCE
ULM. )

TRANS IT TIMES
(Days)

New York - Rotterdam

3,484

7.0

Rotterdam - Marseilles - FOS

2,153

5.0

Marseilles - FOS - Jeddah

2,240

5.2

Jeddah - Khor Fakkan, UAE

2,578

6.0

Khor Fakkan - Singapore

3,200

7.4

Singapore - Hong Kong

1,454

3.4

341

.8

1.075

2.5

357

.8

Yokohama - Panama

7,682

17.8

Panama - Savannah

1,606

3.7

634

1.5

26,774

61. 1

Hong Kong - Kaoshsiung
Kaoshsiung - Kobe
Kobe - Yokohama

Savannah - New York

TOTALS

Sources:

U.S. Navy Oceanographic Office
Distances Between Ports. 1965
Author's Calculations (Utilizing Mercator Method)
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TA.BLE 2

PROPOSED FEEDER SERVICE DISTANCES

LINE HAUL PORT/VESSEL

FEEDER PORT

Rotterdam:

Fe1ixstowe
Dublin
Greenock
Aarhus
Goteburg
Hamburg

1 - 110 T.E.U.
2 - 175 T.E.U.
3 - 450 T. E. U•
Marsei 11 es/Fl}i
1 - 175 T.E.U.

Khor Fakkan, UAE
2 - 275 T.E.U.
2 - 225 T.E.U.

Singapore
3 - 225 T.E.U.

Leghorn
Genoa
Barcelona
Valencia

115
686
856

454
553
307
236

204
189
347

Damman
Kuwai t
Muscat
Cochin
Bombay
Karachi

1600

Madras
Calcutta
Cha1na
Co1umbo+
Chittagong
Bangkok*
Penang*
Jakarta*

1649.
1578
1581
1517
842

Kaoshiung

Manila

Kobe
1 - 110 T.E.U.

Busan

Colombo may be used for a line haul port
* Space Charter Agreements

+

Sources:

DISTANCE

Distances Between Ports, 1965
Author1s Calculations

40

180
336
347
1193

689
1533

367

490

308

The backbone of the route lies in the eastbound
trans-Pacific leg.
most traffic.

This is the trade route containing the

Vessel operators have been experiencing load

factors between 80 and 85 percent on this vital leg.
The weakest link in the system is the Europe to Far
East trade.

This trade is overtonnaged with load factors

running from 60 percent to 80 percent (Seatrade, 1985b) ."
The service is also running in the wrong direction across
the North Atlantic, as load factors are higher in the westbound direction.

~iven

the current strength of the dollar,

the load factors eastbound on the North Atlantic are low.
A decline in the strength of the dollar could spark u.s. exports in the future, thereby improving this situation.
In Northern Europe, the line haul port (stop made by
the trunkline vessels) will be Rotterdam.

There will be

several se rvt ces feeding cargo into Rotterdam.

Two vessels

will feed cargo from Greenock, Scotland and Dublin, Ireland
into Felixstowe, England.

From Felixstowe the cargo will be

transshipped to Rotterdam and loaded aboard the large ships.
Two other feeder services will supply cargo from Sweden and
Denmark.

As Rotterdam has a natural attraction for German,

French, and Belgian cargo, U.S. Lines will have good market
coverage in Northern Europe.
The Mediterranean port will be in Marseilles, FOS; a
container terminal built thirty miles from Marseilles. Cargo
from Spain and Italy will be fed into FOS, as well as shipped
in by rail from interior regions.

u.S. Lines has been prac-

ticing "price absorption" in Europe, a practice where an ocean

41

carrier will subsidize the inland movement of cargo to a
port in order to garner cargo.
The service will make two port ' calls in the Middle
East.

The first will be at Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

This is

a major container port in the area with the seventeenth
largest throughput of containers in 1982 (Containerization
International Yearbook, 1984).

The second mid-eastern call

will be at the new container port of Khor Fakkan, which lies
outside of the Straits of Hormuz in the United Arab Emirates
CUAE).

Cargo wi 11 be fed into Khor Fakkan from Kuwait, Paki-

stan, and Western India.
To date, no decision has been announced as to whether
or not Colombo, Sri Lanka will be a line haul port.

If not,

the southern and southeastern Asian cargo will be fed into
Singapore.

It would make sense to stop in Colombo, Sri Lanka

as it would drastically decrease feeder distances and related
costs.

Singapore will be serviced and cargo fed from Malaysia,

Thailand and Indonesia.
The following port will be Hong Kong, then on to
Kaoshsiung which will receive cargo from the Philippines.
Japan will be serviced with cargo from Busan, Korea.

Kobe,

The

final port in the Far East will be Yokohama.
The vessels will proceed across the North Pacific to
Balboa, and there is a great deal of speculation as to how
much cargo will be transshipped at Panama from the former Delta
and Moore McCormack operations.

The United States line haul

ports will be Savannah and New York with barge feeder services
servicing other East Coast ports.
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The total trip will take eighty four days, with
service provided on a weekly basis.

The ships will service

seven of the top ten container ports in the world (Containerization International Yearbook, 1984).

As proposed here,

the total of thirty four countries will be served, including
the South American nations.

The route appears to give exten-

sive worldwide coverage, which will enable the feeder services
to capture more north/south cargo which is expected to increase
in importance in the future, as well as link the three main
cargo-producing regions in the northern hemisphere.

Advantages and Disadvantages of the RWS
If developed and operated properly, the RWS can qive a
shipowner flexibility which the operator of the point to point
service does not enjoy.

This flexibility can manifest itself

in numerous ways, but, there are also some serious disadvantages
of the system which could overcome this increased flexibility.
The idea of running vessels on triangular and multi"leg routes
has been used successfully in the past, most notably in the
bulk trades.

The application of this type of routing to the

highly capital intense container business brinqs its own unique
advantages and disadvantaqes.
The main advantage of the RWS is the fact that slots can
be utilized more economically.

The ships will load at one port

for a multitude of ports, and the myriad of short haul possibilities can lead to greater slot utilization.

The U.S. ' Lines

system may be able to earn freight three or four times from one
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slot on one global voyage.

As each ship will service

several trading areas, it will also be possible to obtain
an optimum cargo stowage to effectively utilize the ship's
time.
The route selected by u.s. Lines also offers certain
advantages.

The route connects the three main trading

areas of the world, and is running in the right direction
on the Pacific, which is the world's strongest route.

There

are numerous opportunities to feed in North/South cargoes
which are expected to grow as the developing nations industrialize.

There is. room for expansion built into the system, and

feeder services will be able to link certain geographic regions
(Indian subcontinent, East Africa, etc.) with a truly economic
linehaul service normally not available to them.
As a basically synergistic system, the RWS offers unique
flexibility in its actual operation.

Because it services

multiple routes, the shipowner is able to cross-subsidize
capital and marketing efforts from the stronger routes to the
weaker routes.

This will be · especially important to u.S.

Lines, which is operating under a high debt burden, and must
work from a zero cargo base

i

certain routes.

Despite the aforementioned advantages, there are numerous
disadvantages in the system leading many to believe that the RWS
is not the formula for success.

The users of the service will

have to be introduced to its advantages and alter their shipping
schedules accordingly.

Although the RWS offers certain unique

advantages to shippers, such as the ability to send unsold
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merchandise around the world in search of a market, unless
the benefits of the RWS are passed onto the shippers they
may be led to believe the system is advantaqeous to ship
operator's cost structures, while providing marginal
benefits to the users of the system.
The system is complex, and requires constant fine
tuning.

A high degree of proficiency in cargo stowage will

be needed to avoid problems of overstowage of containers, as
well as overcarried and short-landed cargoes.

The logistical

problems of container positioning can be reduced by offloading and onloading an equivalent number of containers in
each. port.

In the context of positioning the containers, the

Evergreen counter-rotating system provides superior flexibility over the U.S. Lines system, and requires less containers
per ship in the pipeline.
Pertaining to costs, the U.S. Lines' RWS will suffer
from high costs"for worldwide administration, canal tolls,
equipment and feeder services, in addition to the costs associated with double-handling of cargo.
vice non-economic routes.
quite a chore.

The RWS must also ser-

To fill these giant vessels will be

The bottom line is that U.S. Lines will have to

offer significant rate reductions or finance a tremendous marketing effort.

The savings in per-slot ship costs afforded by

the Econships may well be consumed by increased costs associated
with running the entire system.
Round-the-World services have been shown to be only marginally superior to point-to-point services by computer model (Pear-
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son and Garratt, 1982}.

The various approaches which have been

utilized in the past by American President Lines and Barber
Blue "Sea, as well as current services by U.S. Lines, Evergreen,
and Neptune Orient Lines, show significant differences in their
philosophies.

By adding to this equation the economies of scale

of Econships, the debate is further complicated.

variations

such as a horseshoe-shaped global itinerary have also been
suggested as an alternative to RWS (Pearson and Fossey, 1984)
Time will tell if RWS is indeed the direction toward which liner
shipping will move.
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CHAPTER THREE
STORMCLOUDS ON THE HORIZON
Potential Protectionist Problems
As previously described, the RWS will provide
service (direct or indirect) to thirty four nations
practicing all forms of protectionist impediments.
An attempt to analyze the impediments of all thirty
four nations would be a major work in itself: therefore, the focus here will be on a regional basis.
The major crosstrades which u.s. Lines will be
able to participate in include:

1.

Europe/Middle East.

2.

Europe/Far East and Southeast Asia/Europe.

3.

Middle East/Far East and Southeast Asia.

4.

Far East and Southeast Asia/Latin America.

5.

Latin America/Europe.

There are numerous short haul trades in which the line
could provide service.

A. u.S. Lines spokesman has sta ted

that up to 50 percent of the Company's revenues could be
generated in the crosstrades in the future (American Shipper,
19831 .
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The degree to which a nation will impose an impediment
is perhaps a direct manifestation of a nation's desire to
establish, expand, or in some instances, halt the decline of
its merchant fleet.

Table 3 shows the merchant fleets of

thirty four nations serviced by the RWS in 1972 and 1982.

Al-

though certain factors, such as the development of open
registries, and increased efficiency of the newer container
vessels are not taken into full account in this example, the
table can be used to detect trends in these nations' merchant
fleets.
Another assumption is that nations having government
controlled fleets tend to have increased desires to protect
those fleets, compared to nations having strictly commercially
owned merchant fleets.

Table 4 shows 18 of 34 nations operate

government controlled fleets.

It should be noted that all but

two of these nations, France and Taiwan, will be indirectly
served with foreign flag feeder services.

u.s.

Lines could appease some of these governments by

utilizing their flag vessels as feeders.

Problems could still

arise if one ship serviced several nations.

If u.S. Lines

line-haul service is in direct competition with services offered
by a national line, hiring that nation's vessels as feeders may
not reduce the impacts of impediments.
The different types of impediments employed by these
thirty four nations are presented in Table 5.

Eight of the

thirty four nations practice all four types, while five do not

4B

TABLE

3

NATIONS SERVED BY ROUND-THE-WORLD SERVICE
Number of General Cargo Vessels
1972-1982

United Kingdom
Ireland
Netherlands
Denmark
Sweden
France
Spain
Italy
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Kuwait
oman
Pakistan
India
Bangladesh
Sri Lanka
Singapore
(All
Malaysia
Indonesia
(All
Thailand
Taiwan
Philippines
Korea
Japan
Panama
(All
Columbia
(All
Ecuador
(All
Peru
(All
Chile
(All
Venezuela
Brazil
Argentina
(All
Uruguay
Hong Kong

Sources:

1972

1982

819
7
316
202
175
219
230
223
6

375

27

Vessels)
Vessels)

Vessels)
Vessels)
Vessels)
Vessels)
Vessels)
Vessels)

351
315
126
161
317
229
82
4
21
9

54
183
2

231

135
19
87
21
101
102
74
1148
528
35
8
34
4.7
43
148
61
18

400
86
214
83
111
176
250
707
1849
37
42
64
35
60
192
105
19

(1983)

(1983)
(1983)

Maritime Administration, A Statistical Analysis
of the World's Merchant Fleets, 1972 and 1982
Seatrade Publications: Arab Shipping 1984,
Far East Shipping 1984, Latin American Shipping, 1983
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TABLE 4

NATIONS OWNING NATIONAL FLEETS SERVED BY
ROUND THE WORLD SERVICES

Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Columbia
France
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Italy
Kuwait
Malaysia
Pakistan
Peru
Spain
Taiwan
Thailand
Uruguay
Venezuela

Source:

Records of the Federal Maritime Commission, 1980
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TABLE 5
NATIONS SERVED BY ROUND-THE-WORLD SERVICE
Political Impediments to Cross trading
Nation
United Kingdom
Ireland
Netherlands
Denmark
Sweden
France
Spain
Italy
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Kuwait
oman
Pakistan
India
Bangladesh
Sri Lanka
Singapore
Malaysia
Indonesia
Thailand
Taiwan
Philippines
Korea
Japan
Panama
Columbia
Ecuador
Peru
Chile
Venezuela
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Hong Kong

*

Codist
y*
y*

Government
Protection

Commercial
Practices

y

y

y
y

y*

Y

N

N

y*
y*
y*

Y
Y

Y

Y

Y
N
N
N
N
Y
N

N
N
N
N
Y
Y

N

Y

N
N
N

Y
N
N
N

Y

N
Y
Y
N
N
Y

Y
N

N

N

Y

Y

y*

N
N
Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

N
N

N

Has stated Intention of Ratifying the code.;

Source:

Mana1ytics, Inc. U.S. Flag Cross-trading, 1984
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y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N

Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

y
y

y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N

Y
Y

N
N
N

y
y
y
Y
N
Y

Treaties &
Agreements

Y
N
N
N
N

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

impose any impediments to crosstrading.

An analysis of this

type is weakened by not showing the intensity of the application of an impediment.
An example of this weakness is evident in the case of
Brazil, which practices only two forms of protectionism. However, Brazilian trades are among the most restricted in the
world, due to a plethora of bilateral agreements, and severe
government protection.

In spite of this weakness, Table 5

can be used to detect potential problem areas when used in conjunction with a priori knowledge '.
The first region to be considered is Europe.

Of the

eight nations . considered, three show a decline in number of
vessels between 1972 and 1982.
growth.

The others recorded modest

Four of the nations owned government fleets.

All of

the nations practiced all forms of protectionism; except for
Sweden which practices none.

It would seem that Europe has

incentive to increase their impediments to halt the decline of
certain fleets, and encourage the growth of national fleets.
U.S. Lines is especially interested in the crosstrades
between Europe and the Middle East, Southern Asia, and the Far
East regions.

The main impediments to U.S. Lines' success in

these trades are the existing strong, closed conferences.
In 1984, the Far Eastern Freight Conference (FEFC),
carried 73 percent of the Europe/Far East trade.

U.S. Lines

has been running as an independent; however, a time may come
when U.S. Lines may choose to enter appropriate conferences,
to assure stability of cargo and rates as supplied by these
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conferences.

This may be disallowed due to the closed nature

of the conferences.

This subject has been the central issue

in the C.S.G. negotiations (Seatrade, 1984) .
In addition to closed conferences, a corollary issue in
the C.S.G. talks has been ways in which various nations in the
EEC implement the UNCTAD Liner Code.

Although all nations in

the EEC have become signatory to the Code with the Brussels
Package reservations, each nation has retained ability to
ratify the Code as they feel fit.

Of these survey nations,

only the Netherlands has ratified the Code at present.

One

United States fear concerning the Code is that unused shares
of cargo flowing between the EEC and developing nations would
be allocated to the fleets of other EEC members.

If the Code

is applied in a very broad sense in European crosstrades, the
independent operators, such as U.S. Lines, and Taiwanese lines
Yang Ming and Evergreen, could suffer considerably.
In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia experienced a rapid increase in merchant ships between 1972 and 1982.
na~ions

The other

have nominal fleets of general-cargo vessels.

in this region is cooperation between nations.

A trend

The United Arab

Shipping Company (UASC) is the national flag line of six
countries: Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Quatar, Saudi Arabia, and
the U.A.E.

In 1983, the UASC increased its container capacity

by 50 percent.

UASC has filed an application fo r entrance into

the FEFC, which would put it in competition with U.S. Lines in
the Europe/Far East trades.
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The National Shipping Company of

Saudi Arabia (NSCSA) has increased its containership fleet
considerably, and will vie

for cargo flowing to the Far East

with u.S. Lines (Rose, 1984).
The 'Arab countries are attempting to achieve the goals
of the development strategy for the third United Nations
Development Decade, which is trying to create a situation
where 20 percent of the world's fleet is owned by developing
nations (Salman Ad-Hashim , 1983).

At the present time, none

of the study nations in the Middle East practice impediments.
Because of their low labor costs and petroleum self sufficiency,
these fleets may be able to increase their market share without
resorting to protectionist measures.
The Southern Asian region is typified by a great deal of
protectionism.

Of the study nations, only India showed an in-

crease in the size of her merchant fleet according to the data
available.

Pakistan and India have nationally controlled fleets.

All of the nations in this region practice some form of protectionism.

At present, with no port calls by the line-haul

vessels made public by u.S. Lines, this region will be served
by feeder services to the U.A.E. and Singapore.

Sri Lanka has

taken the unprecedented step of chartering vessels from Maersk
Line of Denmark to act as its national flag carrier.

There are

no indications of a serious increase in protectionist actions
in South Asia in the near future (Manalytics, 1984).
In the Southeast Asian region, all five of the nations
belonging to the Association of South East Asian Nations Bloc
(ASEAN) showed sizeable gains in general-cargo fleets from
1972 to 1982.

These five nations consist of Thailand,
54

Singapore, Malaysia,

Indonesia, Phillipines, four of which

own national fleets.

These nations are split on the Code,

as Thailand and Singapore have not become signatory, and
the remaining three have all ratified.
are polarized as to protectionism.

The ASEAN nations

Singapore and Malaysia

are in the "open seas" camp, the Philippines and Indonesia
support cargo reservation, and Thailand has no clear-cut
policy.

ASEAN recently agreed to the need to reserve as

much trade as possible for ASEAN flags, using modified UNCTAD
type legislation.

In spite of this agreement, it seems the

ASEAN camp will remain divided with increasing problems in
Indonesia and the Philippines and no changes in the other
nations (Journal of Commerce, 1985).
The nations serviced in the Far East region consist of
Hong Kong (territory of U.K.), Taiwan, Korea and Japan.
tween 1972 and 1982, Japanese and Korean fleets were

Be-

~reatly

expanded, while that of Taiwan grew modestly , and the fleet
of Hong Kong remained the same.
has a national fleet.

In this region , only Taiwan

Concerning protectionism, Korea is the

problem child which practices all forms of protectionism. The
Korean Government has increased its involvement in maritime
affairs.
therefore,

Its financial community has a large stake in the RWS,
it is doubtful that Korea will take any action which

would hurt U.S . Lines, such as strict enforcement of the
Korea - Taiwan bilateral agreement.
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Japan has announced intentions to ratify the UNCTAD
Code, and the way the Japanese implement the Code may have
bearing upon the success of U.S. Lines in Japanese trades.
Hong Kong has no cargo preference laws.

Taiwan has

~rected

protectionism for certain commodites, but, as Taiwan has
built a huge fleet of vessels which will offer round-the-world
services, it seems in Taiwan's best interests to keep crosstrades open.
Of nine Latin American nations potentially serviced,
six showed substantial gains in number of general-cargo vessels
between 1972 and 1982.
fleets.

Seven of these nine operate government

Thus , it is obvious that Latin nations are heavily

emphasizing the development of their merchant fleets.

With

the acquisition of Moore McCormack and Delta Lines, U.S. Lines
will be a force in the Latin/U.S. trade.

However, the abilitv

of U.S. Lines to crosstrade in this region is questionable.
Only three of these nine nations have acceded to the Code:
Chile, Peru, and Venezuela.

However, government protectionism

is practiced by all nations, with the exception of Panama.

Bi-

lateral agreements, government impelled cargoes, and pooling
arrangements abound in Latin trades.

The U.S. Lines' strategy

in Latin America seems to be carriage of cargoes from the Far
East to Panama for transshipment by smaller vessels.

Outbound,

the service could accept cargoes for the United States, Europe ,
or the Middle East.

Due to the preponderance of agreements be-

tween Latin and European nations, and the strong presence of
carriers from both sides, the ability of U.S. Lines to capture
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outbound crosstrade cargoes is considered questionable.
The biggest trend in Latin shipping is the fact that
it is rapidly being containerized (Fells, 1982).

Another

trend which may develop is the rise of " c o ntinentalism" in
shipping (Climent, 1983).

The pooling of resources and ex-

pertise will make growing Latin shipping presence even more
powerful, if achieved.
With the exception of the Middle East, U.S. Lines
faces impediments to cargo access in every region in which
it provides RWS.

The intensity of application of cargo

preference measures is dependent upon many factors.

These

factors include our international relations, as well as the
general state of the world economy.

Measuring the Effectiveness of U.S. Policy
The attempt to measure the effectiveness of any policy
is based on a great many assumptions due to the large number
of intangible factors.

An effective policy is one which can

obtain the stated objectives without causing due harm to
other, sometimes unrelated interests.
within the field of foreign affairs.

Maritime policy falls
Any international policy

must fall within the general philosophy of a nation towards
other nations.

Many considerations must be taken into account,

including geopolitical, as well as cultural and economic interests.

To further complicate matters, foreign policy must

strive to appease domestic interests as much as possible in
achieving its objective.
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Table 6 shows the level of bilateral liner trades
(by weightl

nd, als6 the balance existing in those trades.

European level of trades are generally heavy.

Most trades

are fairly balanced, with the exceptions of trades with
France and Italy, which are balanced in favor of Europeans.
The united Kingdom is also an exception which is balanced in
favor of the United States; and, in the case of Saudi Arabia,
grossly so.
by weight.

The trades of ASEAN nations

a~e

fairly balanced

In the Far East regions, Japanese trade, by far

the heaviest, shows a balance in favor of the United States.
The imbalanced trades in Latin America are the Venezuelan
trade, which favors the United States and the Brazilian
trade, which favors Brazil.
An assessment by weight does not give a good indication
of the balance of trade value.

However, trades which are in-

balanced by weight can have significant impacts on ship operations, which can be exacerbated by political

impediments~

Table 7 shows nine elements which should be taken into
account by United States maritime policy-makers when responding
to cross trace impediments.

These factors will be analyzed with

regard to nations involved in the U.S. Lines Round-the-World
service.
others.

Some factors will be more heavily considered than
Using a great amount of assumptions, an attempt will

be made to measure the effectiveness of certain policy initiatives in certain geographic regions.
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NATIONS SERVED BY ROUND-THE-WORLD SERVICE
Level of U.S. Liner Trade 1982

Nation
United Kingdom
Ireland
Netherlands
Denmark
Sweden
France
Spain
Italy
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Kuwait

Oman
Pakistan
India
Bangladesh
Sri Lanka
Singapore
Malaysia
Indonesia
Thailand
Taiwan
Philippines
Korea
Japan
Panama
Columbia
Ecuador
Peru
Chile
Venezuela
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Hong Kong

:rmports From
U. S. (Tons)
1,136,643
67,691
880,531
116,988
227,688
58C,289
367,£64
628,658
1,479,381
229,360
145,736
31,508
169,918
532,993
150,927
78,090
455,505
154,045
543,944
218,147
1,671,510
443,383
1 ,493,816
4 ,277,047
191,244
326,293
211;040
311,510
213,910
1,017,620
351,2'88
267,015
22,454
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Exports To

U • S. ~(Tons)

805,315
62,037
738,646
196,520
241,086
929,986
521,979
1,394,219
5,225
2,389
973
103
40,695
257,356
88,102
41,099
169,448
279,113
488,954
273,152
1,980,320
335 ,992
927,650
3,424,935
64,828
148,202
336,775
193,667
314,425
24,R96
1,210,119
258,914
15,614

TABLE "7
SECTION I:
Factors To Consider When Responding To

Crosstrade Impediments

1.

Level of bilateral trade with the United States.

2.

Balance of trade between Imports and Exports.

3.

Level of Flag Carriage of bilateral trade.

4.

Extent of crosstrades in U.s. trades.

5.

Treaties in force between the two nations.

6.

Economic Aid extended to the Foreign country.

7.

Military Aid and Military Importance.

8.

Supplier of Strategic Materials

9.

The level of cargo at stake. and the economic
impact to U.S. carriers at loss.

* Source:

Mana1ytics, Inc.
U.S. Flag Crosstrading, 1984
*(Inc1udes Section II, Table 8)
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The top ten crosstraders in u.s. trades are presented
by nationality as well as flag, in Section II of Table 7.
Of these top ten cross traders shown, seven of the top ten by
nationality, and six of the top ten by flag are serviced by
Round-the-World service, and have a vital interest in keeping
the crosstrades open.
Table 8 shows the percentage of u.s. trade compared
to each nation's total trade, and vice-a-versa, as well as
the ranking of the United States as a trade partner.

The

united States was the number one partner in eleven of thirtyfour cases, and in the top jive of trading partners in all
cases.

The United States trade was most important to several

Latin and Far Eastern nations.

Japan is overwhelmingly the

most valuable trading partner, with the United Kingdom placing
second, and Saudi Arabia in third place.
Table 9 shows the amount of direct economic and military
aid given to survey nations receiving funds from the Agency for.
International Development (AID).

Also shown in Table 9 is the

amount of aid those nations receive from international organizations which the United States contributes to.

There are other

private and public organizations which provide direct aid, as
well as numerous loans and other forms of economic assistance.
The AID contribution is a representative case to show where
funds may be flowing.

A majority of direct aid flows to the

Southern Asian regions, with ASEAN countries next in line.
The problem of military assistance is complex, as large
amounts of covert aid and arms sales are financed under the
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TABLE 7 (CoH4tiaued)

SECTION II:
Top Ten Crosstraders in U.S. Trades

A.

By Nation:
1-

West Gennany

2.

Denmark

3.

Norway

4.

United Kingdom

5.

Australia

6.

Japan

7.

Hong Kong

8.

Sweden

9.

Taiwan

10.

B.

Netherlands

By Fl ag: *
1-

Panama

2.

West Gennany

3.

Liberia

4.

Denmark

5.

United Kingdom

6.

Singapore

7.

Greece

8.

Norway

9.

Netherlands

10.

Sweden

* 13 (b)( 5) wou1d be an effective response
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TABLE 8
NATIONS SERVED BY ROUND THE WORLD SERVICE
Percentage of U.S. Trade to Total Trade
Percentage of· Nations Trade to Total U.S. Trade

Nation
United Kingdom
Ireland
Netherlands
Denmark
Sweden
France
Spain
Italy
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Kuwait
Oman
Pakistan
India
Bangladesh
Sri Lanka
Singapore
Malaysia
Indonesia
Thailand
Taiwan
Philippines
Korea
Japan
Panama
Columbia
Ecuador (1981)
Peru
Chile
Venezuela
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Hong Kong

Value US $
US Trade/Total Trade
11
13
9

Nation Trade/Total US
5.0
0.2
1.0
0.3
0.8
2.3
0.6
2.3
3.1
0.8

10
12
11
6
13
15
15
13

(2)*
(2)
(3 )
(4)
(3 )
(4)
(1)
(3)
(1 )
(2)
"(2)
(3 )
(2 )
(1)
(3)
(5 )
(3)
(2)
(2 )
(3)

23
23
18
34
35
39
34
22
48
15
23
10
10

( 1)
(2)
( 1)
( 1)
(1 )
( 1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(2)
(1)
(3 )
(3)

0.8
2.4
15.8

7

14
8
14
7

21
13
14
7

0.6
0.9
0.8
1.8
0.4

0.3
0.5
0.4
0.3
2.0
1.8
0.5
2.3

Source: 1982 Yearbook of International Trade Statistics,
United Nations

* ( ) :

U.S. Ranking as a Trade Partner
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Of
.0

TABLE

9

NATIONS SERVED BY ROUND-THE-WORLD SERVICE
1982 Aid R&cipients

NATION
United Kingdom
Ireland
Netherlands
Denmark
Sweden
France
Spain
Italy
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Kuwait
Oman
Pakistan
India
Bangladesh
Sri Lanka
Singapore
Malaysia
Indonesia
Thailand
Taiwan
Philippines
Korea
Japan
Panama
Columbia
Ecuador
Peru
Chile
Venezuela
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Hong Kong

Source:

(In~illions/Q.a. Dol~ars)

Direct Aid
Received

Military
Assistance

22
52

127

15
200
221
172
71

30
260
.1
.2
2.1

91
36

42
80

1,394
874

107

51

694

13

16

127

23

5

444

Total From Int'l
Organizations

40

(1983)

17
555
2,287
599
170

Agency for International Development
Congressional Presentation. Fiscal Year 1986, 1984
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Foreign Military Sales. Program (FMS).

The primary recipient

of direct assistance was Pakistan, followed by several ASEAN
countries next in line for arms.

In geopolitical terms, the

Round-the-World service stops in most of the more strategically important areas ot the world.

Of vital importance to

military strategy in the United States are

Euro~e

(NATO), the

Middle East (oil), Japan and the Philippines (allies and sites
of major overseas deployments), as well as the Panama Canal;
and this

~ould

have profound effects on maritime" policy.

Another strategic consideration is the supply ot materials
considered vital to the United States economy and military. Ot
prime importance is oil, and the Middle East and Venezuela are
key suppliers.

Of non-oil materials, Brazil supplies manganese

(19 percent of imports from 1977-1980), and the Philippines
supplies chromite (15 percent ot imports from 1977-1980).
The nature of treaties in force between two nations can
also exert an intluence on maritime policies.

Besides treaties

for security reasons, there are treaties named Treaties ot
Friendship, Commerce and Navigations (FCN).

The United States

has FCN treaties with twelve ot the thirty tour survey nations
in all regions except Southern and Southeast Asia.

Since an

FCN treaty is basically a statement ot goodwill, the application
of equal access to trade provisions may be of questionable relevance to U.S. maritime policy.
The final two factors to be considered in assessing the
potential policy responses are the level ot carriage ot the two
nations at either end ot a crosstrade route, and amount ot cargo
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potentially at risk.

These are situation-dependent variables

which are difficult to analyze.
Table 10 shows the effectiveness of several maritime
responses to crosstrade impediments in the survey nations.
The parameters for the effectiveness of responses is also
included at the bottom of the table.

Tariff suspension under

Section l3(b) (5) would be effective in eight of thirty four
cases; primarily in European and Far Eastern nations, as well
as open registry nations crosstrading in U.S. trades.

Denial

of access to U.S. ports, or the imposition of operating restrictions would be effective in twenty three of thirty four
cases, which reflects the importance of U.S. trade to many
nations.
Table 11 shows the effectiveness of non-maritime
responses to crosstrading, including parameters listed at the
bottorr. of the table.

Increased duties or the imposition of

embargoes or quotas, which can be protectionist as well as
punitive, would be effective in twenty eight of thirty four
cases.

The exceptions are in the EEC where the nations'

mutual trade is as important as U.S. trade.
The alteration of direct economic assistance would be
effective in thirteen of thirty four cases.

This would be

effective in the Southern and Southeast Asian regions, and
certain Latin nations as well.

The alteration of direct

military aid would be effective in nine cases.

Some of the

complexities of military aid and arms sales were alluded to
earlier.

G6

TABLE 10
NATIONS SERVED BY ROUND-THE-WORLD SERVICE
Effectiveness of Maritime Responses
13(b)(5)

Nation

Tariff Suspension

United Kingdom
Ireland
Netherlands
Denmark
Sweden
France
Spain
Italy
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Kuwait
Oman
Pakistan
India
Bangladesh
Sri Lanka
Singapore
Malaysia
Indonesia
Thailand
Taiwan
Philippines
Korea
Japan
Panama
Columbia
Ecuador
Peru
Chile
Venezuela
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Hong Kong

Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N

Deny Nat'l Vessels Port Access/
Impose Operating Restrictions
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y

Y
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N

~

Y
N
N
N

Y
N

Y

Y

N
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
~

~

13(b)(5): Yas, if top ten crosstraders in U.S . trades by
nation or flag.
Deny Access:

Yes, if nation's flag carriage in U.S. trades
is greater than 10 percent (imports/exports)
or a major crosstrader in U.S. trades .
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TABLE

11

SERVED BY ROUND-THE-WORLD SERVICE
Effectiveness of No~-Maritime Respo~ses

~ATIONS

Nation
United Kingdom
Ireland
Netherlands
Denmark
Sweden
France
Spain
Italy
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Kuwait
Oman
Pakistan
India
Bangladesh
Sri Lanka
Singapore
Malaysia
Indonesia
Thailand
Taiwan
Philippines
Korea
Japan
Panama
Columbia
Ecuador
Peru
Chile
Venezuela
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Hong Kong

Increased Duties:

Increased Duties
Emb ar:.g.<?_es -Quo t as
.y

Y
:-i
N

Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y

-

-

-

Oil
Oil
Oil

:'i
N
N
N
N
N

N
N
N
N

Y
Y
N

Y

N
N

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

N

Y
Y
Y
N

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Alter Aid
Economic Military

~

N
N
N
N
N

Y
Y
N
N
N
N

-

Tin

N
N

N

-

Tin

Y
Y

Y
Y

N

N

-

Chromite

-

Oil
Manganese

Y

Y

N
N

N
\f

Y

Y

N

N

Y
Y

Y
Y

N
N
N
N
N
N

N
~T

~

N
N
N

Yes, if trade with U.S. greater than
10% total trade by value.

Alter Aid: Yes. if significant amount given.
Materials have strategic importance which may effect policy.
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In conclusion, the most favored policy responses, on a
regional basis, would be:

Europe: .

13(b)(5), tariff suspension
or operating restrictions

Middle East:

none, given survey parameters

Southern Asia:

alteration of economic and
military aid or quotas

Far East:

13(b)(5), tarift suspension
or operating restrictions

Latin America:

operating restrictions and
embargoes

The use ot embargoes, quotas and alteration of aid have
not proven effective in other areas of foreign affairs.

The

emphasis in our maritime policy should be on maritime responses.
The linkage to non-maritime responses should only be made in
This type ot policy

cases of severe damage to U.S. carriers.
is effective with major maritime nations.

The response to non-

maritime nations should be to continue the current policy of
tailoring responses to each situation.

Thus, there are no

specific policies which U.S. Lines can request the Government
to implement that would satisfy their needs in all geographic
areas.

Outlook for the Future
Protectionism is a trend which will surely continue, and
increase in strength in the future.
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Indeed, the current

strength of the dollar has increased protectionist pressures
in our own nation.

It is evident that U.S. Lines faces im-

pediments in every region, and the level of aid it can expect
from the Government in fighting these impediments varies considerably by region.

Future events which may very well bring

protectionism to a boiling point include:

1.

A newly revised and more implementable UNCTAD
Liner Code in 1988.

2.

The proliferation of bilateral agreements.

3.

A serious shake-out in liner shipping, which
many believe will occur in the next several
years (Muller, 1985).

4.

A serious loss of cargo carried by conferences
such as the FEFC, causing a backlash upon
independents.

5.

An increase in commercial impediments and agreements, such as the Maersk/Sri Lanka pact, which
exclude other carriers from certain trades.

6.

The sale of older container tonnage, in lieu of
scrapping, to developing nations.

The United States has already successfully, it only temporarily, imposed its will to keep the seas open in dealings with
the Philippines, Korea, and several Latin nations.

The applica-

tion of our policy to crosstrades awaits its first usage; however,
speculation as to its effectiveness abounds.

In any case, it is

certain that any United States response to crosstrading impediments will have only limited international support.
Perhaps a more viable method of combatting protectionism is
to utilize a more commercial tact .
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Increased cooperation between

United States carriers and foreign carriers is now underway.
American shippers are participating in C.S.G. and other negotiations through the Shippers for Competitive Ocean Transportation (SCOT) organization (Jessen and Davis, 1985).

The goal

of both carriers and shippers should be to reduce the government's role in solving maritime problems.
U.S. Lines will have to develop an effective dialogue with
both foreign governments and carriers in order to exhaust all
remedies before the FMC is forced to step" in and deal with the
~inkages

that cause such complexity in" foreign policy.
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CHAPTER FOUR
BREAKDOWN OF OPERATING COSTS
Introduction
In order to properly assess the impact of political
impediments upon an RWS, it is necessary to understand the
economic viability of the system.

Due to the lack of pro-

prietary information, as well as the complexity of certain
factors,

(freight rates, port pricing, administration), this

breakdown of costs is merely a thUMbnail sketch.
is a "through" system

As the RWS

which incorporates feeder service and

land transport aspects, a ship's costs are only a fraction of
system costs.

A recent estimate places this ration between

25 percent and 35 percent (Seatrade, 1985b) .
Three sources were used primarily in the analysis of
vessel operating costs.

The differences in the methods of

describing ship costs has been elaborated upon in Chapter
One.

The breakdown used in this study was presented in

~anage-

ment and Operatinq of. American Shioping, by E. Frankel.

A

second source was a 1979 Maritime Administration study on
daily operating expenses, using a C-8 containership's expenses.
The final source is a study of the U.S. Lines RWS by the accounting firm of Laurence Prust and Co., the results were published
in Fairplay Shipping Weekly (Fairplay, 1985).
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The Prust

data was used as a reterence point, and soma data was used
to fill in gaps in the analysis.

Fixed Costs
The tirst class ot costs to be studied are tixed costs.
These include costs tor capital, crew, insurance, and general
administra t ion .

Fixed costs are those which remain st-eady, in

spi t6" of changes in scheduling or >routing o r: the vessel.
The largest single element involved in the daily operating
costs ot a containership is the debt incurred in building the
vessel and the necessary amount ot containers.

In the case ot

the Econships, the hulls cost $47.5 million each.

It is esti-

mated that each vessel will require two full sets ot containers
(estimated at $6,000 per 40 toot container).

Factors such as

depreciation and taxation will not be considered to simplity
the analysis.
There are various methods in estimating the actual costs
involved in purchasing a ship.

These include the net present

value method, the payback method, and the internal rate ot return, ' among others.

Many ot these methods utilize "net cash

flows" which represent the change in the company's cash receipts
and expenditures as a result of the project in question.
It some estimate ot tuture cash tlows could be made,

the

aforementioned methods would be usetul in measuring viability
of the RWS system.

However , since we are merely attempting to

breakdown the financial costs associated with a single vessel,
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a good starting point is to utilize the present value of an
annuity method.

This method measures the value at present of

annual payments made over a given time period at a certain rate
of interest (Slogget, 1984).

where

The formula for this method is:

PV

=

Annuity (x) X PVIF

PV

=

Present Value of Investment

x =
PVIF =

Yearly Payment
Present Value Interest Factor

TO calculate PVIF, tables are used which are derived from the
following formula:

PVIF

where

r
t
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1

=

1

=
=

Interest Rate

+ r)

t)

r

Time over which financinq is arranaed

In the case of the hull, the shipyard f.inanced 80
of the $47.5 million cost at 9 percent over ten years.

~ercent

The line

financed the 20 percent down payment by takinq various loans
with a floating rate (approximately 12 percent) over a

twel~e

year period.
The present value of both down and deferred

pay~ents

were

calculated, along with the present value of the annuity for both,
in order to determine a total annual payment.
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The resultinq

annuity totalled $6,519,265 per ship/year, which translates
to a hull financing cost of $17,861 per day.
In calculating the number of containers purchased per
vessel, several factors must

e considered.

The first is that

two and one half to three sets of containers are required per
vessel.

u.s.

Other factors to be considered include the fact that

Lines is stressing forty foot containers, and already owns

a considerably large amount of containers and chassis (1982 -

u.s.

Lines owned thirty thousand containers and fifteen thousand

chassis).

In view of this information, two sets of forty foot

containers per vessel seem sufficient.

At an estimated cost of

$6,000 per container, the present value of the annuity for fortyfour hundred containers was calculated at $4,667,976, translating
to a daily finance cost for containers of $12,788.
Frankel (1981) stated an average yearly cost of an American
seaman in 1981 to be $51,020, including wages and benefits.

This

cost was appreciated at 6 percent per year, providinq an
estimated annual cost of $72,885 per seaman in 1985.

The annual

costs of two complete crews of twenty one seamen totaled
$3,061,200, translating to a daily cost of $8,500, as stated in
the Prust study (Fairplay, 1985).
Frankel, Prust and MARAD all state insurance costs to be
$1,800 per day, which was used in this analysis.

Both hull and

Protection and Indemnity insurance are included in this amount.
The cost of administration is a thorny issue.

The amount

to be attributed to ship costs versus svstem costs is difficult
to determine.

However, one certain fact is that RWS will require

a worldwide ,administrative network.

With the exception of

the Europe/Far East route, U.S. Lines has an existing administration; due to former service in those areas or through the
acquisition of Delta Lines and Moore-McCormack Lines.
Frankel (l98l) estimated administration costs account
for 22 to 35 percent of operating
be in the top of that category.

costs~

RWS would certainly

These costs will be borne by

twelve vessels on an identical route.

In this analysis, admin-

istrative costs were considered to be 36 percent of total
operating costs.

This figure was then divided by twelve to

estimate per ship costs, which amounted to $1,700 per day. This
daily costs figure is considerably higher than the $1,000 per
day figure as provided in the Prust study.
As a result, fixed costs accounted for a total of $42,650
per day in operating costs, or 66 percent of total operating
costs.

As such a high pe =centage of operatinq costs are not

within a

shipow~er's

ability to chanqe, this can explain why

shipowners act as they do in many cases (i.e., inflexibility
to change, etc.).

Variable Costs
Variable costs are those within a shipowner's ability to
alter given changes in routing, scheduling, or operating procedures.

In a routinq strategy such as the RWS, some costs may

indeed be fixed in nature, but the service has yet to be developed so they are considered as variable.
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A further distinction

will be made between those incurred at sea versus those
incurred in port.
Of variable costs, fuel and lUbe costs make the largest
contribution to operating expenses.

The Econships ar

rated

to burn approximately seventy three tons of bunker C fuel per
day.

An average of $190 per ton for 180 C.S.T. bunker fuel,

or a daily average of $13,870 was derived from the Journal of
Commerce for a week's period of April 8 through April il, 1985.
Lube oil costs, obtained from MARAD data and Frankel as
no figures could be found, resulted in the daily cost of
approximately $1,000.

Econships carry enough fuel to make a

full trip, allowing bunkering where prices are cheapest .

At

the time of this writing, Singapore was the port with the cheapest

bunker~

on the proposed route, with a price of $180 per

ton.
It can be assumed that in port one of three lOOO-kilowatt
generators on the Econships will be running at· all times.

From

industry sources, it has been determined that a qenerator of
this capacity will burn between sixty-two and sixty-three qallo~s

per hour.

At a cost of one dollar per gallon for diesel

fuel, daily fuel costs for periods in port will be approximately
fifteen hundred dollars . .
The next major variable cost is that of supplies and
miscellaneous expenses; the general category allocated for any
unexpected expense.

U.S. Lines will have the advantage in the

acquisition of deck and engine stores, as it is able to bUy in
large quantities where these items are cheapest worldwide.
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In

conjunction with computerized inventories, supply costs can be
kept down.

Frankel

(~98l)

uses an estimate for supply and

miscellaneous expenses of 3.8 percent of operatinq expenses.
This figure was utilized, and a figure of $2,300 per day was
the result.

Although this figure is considerably higher than

that provided by Prust, until potential problems with the
vessels or their designs are resolved, a higher figure for
miscellaneous expenses is justified.
Maintenance and repairs are another variable cost. Included in this category are annual surveys, as well as regular
hull and engine maintenance.

Maintenance costs increase as a

vessel ages, constituting an increasing percentage of operating
costs.

The size of a vessel is also a factor to be considered.

Econships will require special dry-docking facilities, as well as
specialized equipment to effect engine and hull maintenance.
A non-economic factor is the policy of the U.s. r,overnment
on taxation of items acquired abroad, in addition to the use of
foreign shipyards.

Although the Econships are not subsidized,

other U.s. Lines vessels are; therefore, the company must abide
by certain subsidy obligations.
burden in this regard.

Recent legislation may ease the

Both the Prust study and Frankel concur

on the figure of $1,800 per day, thus, this figure was used in
this analysis.
The final costs to be considered are those for port and
canal charges.

rhe figure of $1,500 per day, provided by Prust,

was utilized, given the complexity and dynamic nature of port
pricing.

Many ports develop their own formulas for charging

for use of their facilities, causing prices to be in a state

7R

of constant flux.

This can be attributed to intense inter-

port competition, as ports vie for load center status.
Table 12 provides the tolls for the Suez and Panama
Canals.

One feature of the RWS is it encurs a great amount of

canal related costs.

Per information from an industry source,

$1,600 per day could be accounted

for~

however, the data was

incomplete in costs associated with the Panama Canal, and the
Prust figure of $3,000 per day is more realistic.

Despite its

shortcomings, Table 12 indicates the high expenses an Econship
incurs in transmitting the canals.
Table 13 is a summary of the breakdown of operating
costs.

It can be seen that the costs involved in operating an

Econship total $23 million per annum, or $63,000 per day. This
is several thousand dollars higher than the Prust study given
more emphasis on miscellaneous and administrative costs.
For the large amount of container capacity they afford,
the Econships compare favorably with any other containerships
on a per day basis.

Seatrade,

(1985, c), states a figure of

$38,000 per day for an Evergreen G-class vessel, and $42,000

for a five year old, 1500 TEU European vessel.

On the basis

of hardware, u.S. Lines is more than competitive.

System Costs and Potential Earnings
The major goal of most containership operators today is
to reduce the cost per container-mile to the lowest possible
level, sometimes called a unit or slot cost.

79

Given the

TABLE . 1 2
U.S. LINES "ECONSHIPS"
TRANSIT TOLLS FOR PANAMA AND SUEZ CANALS

PANAMA CANAL
Tolls

51. 83

Per Net Ton

$34,221

18,700 Net Tons
Pilotage
Weekends

$

70

Per Hour

Holidays

$400

Per Hour

$136,884

Total Panama Tolls

Per Annum

SUEZ CANAL
Suez ' Tonnage (Aprox):

Mean between gross and net tonnage
(US $)

Suez Deadweight Ratio (S.D.R.) = 1 .08S9
Tolls

(Laden Vessel Southbound)
First 5 ,000 Tons ~ 4 .55 S.D.R.
Next 15 ,000 Tons @ 2.5 S.D .R .
Balance
@ 2.15 S.D.R.

=
=
=

22 ,750
37,500
38,700

S.D.R.
S.D.R.
S.D.R.

=

7,421
15,000

S.D.B..
S.D.R.

Total S.D.H. per transit

=

121,371

S.D.R .

Total

$

per transit

=

Total

$

per annum

Total

$

Panama and Suez Canals

=
=

$111,462
$445,849
$582,733

-Containers stacked more than
two high per deck - add 7.5%
Tugs and Pilotage

Tot:ll Cana.l Costs
Sources:

per day

s

Industry Source/Personal Calculation

1.600

TABLE 13

u.s.

LINES "ECONSHIPS"
OPERATING COSTS

A.

General Information
Eastbound Voyage
Nautical Miles
Time At Sea/Voyage
Time In Canals/Voyage
Port Time/Voyage
Voyage/Annum
Distance/Annum
TEU Miles/Annum
At Sea/Annum
Canal Time/Year
Port Time/Year

B.

C.

D.

83 days
26,744 Total Distance
·62 Days
3 Days
19 Days
4.3
157,999.2
690 Million
267
12
86

Fixed Costs Per Day
Hull Financing
Container Financing
Crew Costs
Insurance Costs
Administration Costs

$17,861
12,789
8,500
1,800
1,700

Total:

$42,650

Variable Costs Per Day At Sea
Fuel Costs
Lube Oil Costs
Maintenance and Repair
Supplies and Miscellaneous

$13,870
1,000
1,800
2,300

Total:

$18,970

Variable Costs Per Day in Port/Canal
Fuel and Lube Costs in Port
Port Charges
Maintenance and Repair
Supplies and Miscellaneous

$ 1,500
6,200
1,800
2,300

Total:

$11,800

Canal Charges Per Day:
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3,000 (365 days)

TABLE 13

u.s. LINES "ECONSHIPS"
OPERATING COSTS - ANNUAL TOTALS
E.

F.

Fixed Costs
Hull Financing
Container Financing
Crew Costs
Insurance Costs
Administration Costs

$ 6,519,265
4,667,985
3,102,500
657,000
628,628

Total Per Annum

$15,575,378

Variable Costs
AT SEA:
Fuel and Lube
Maintenance and Repair
Supplies/Miscellaneous

$ 4,040,804
488,700
670,075

Total Per Annum/At Sea

$ 5,199,579

IN PORT:

G.

Fuel and Lube
Port Charges
Maintenance and Repair
Supplies/Miscellaneous
Canal Charges

$

141,900
547,500
170,280
217,580
1,095,000

Total Per Annum/In Port

$ 2,172,260

TOTAL PER ANNUM

$22,947,217

TOTAL PER DAY

s

62,869

Cost as Percentage of Total Costs
Fixed Costs:

66 Per Cent

Variable/At Sea:

24 Per Cent

Variable/In Port:

4 Per Cent

Canal Charges:

6 Per Cent

82

proposed itinerary and cost structure, the unit costs for an
Econship are shown in Table 14, for various load factors.
The unit costs calculated are approximately one half of those
associated with a five year old European ship (Seatrade, 1985
cl.

A major reason for the current excess of containerships

on the world market is the fact that decreased manninq, increased fuel efficiency, and economies of scale can reduce costs.
However, it must be remembered that the seaborne leg of a
door-to-door container shipping service may not constitute a
major part of the total shipping costs.

As for

u.s.

Lines,

even a great reduction in unit costs offered by Econships may
not warrant the kind of investment which has been made, given
current market conditions.

The numbers for daily operating

costs and unit costs for the Econships are impressive, but one
must consider the system as a whole to get an idea of the viability of the RWS.

The fact that

u.s.

Lines is concentrating

their efforts on forty foot containers indicates a desire to extend economies of scale to the feeder and

i~land

legs of the RWS.

If the ship costs represented only a third of system costs,
the RWS would require fairly high load factors, utilizing the
operating cost structure given in this analysis.

This assumption

is based on a simplified freight rate structure.

The goal of

Malcolm McLean must be to achieve economies of scale on land,
which would increase the ratio of ship costs to system costs
nearer to forty or fifty percent.

Table 15 illustrates the

freight rates which could be offered on certain routes if the
ship cost/system cost ratio reached 50 percent.
of analysis, the ability of
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u.s.

In this type

Lines to undercut is high.

TABLE 11
U.S. LINES "ECONSHIPS"
OPERATING COSTS

UNIT COST PER CONTAINER MILE
Utilization

100%

3.5 Cents/Container/Mile

75%

4.6 Cents/Container/Mile

50%

6.9 Cents/Container/Mile

25%

13.8 Cents/Container/Mile

COST OF DIVERSION OF VESSEL
Per Mile of Diversion

$146.00

POTENTIAL REVENUES PER VOYAGE
Util ization

100%

$ 21,000,000

75%

15,750,000

50%

10,500,000

25%

5,250,000

POTENTIAL REVENUES BASED ON:
Full Load

Europe/Middle East/Far East

51500/TEU

Full Load

Far East/North America

52000/TEU

Full Load

North Atlantic

51500/TEU

84

TABLE '15
REQUIRED FREIGHT RATES AT 75% UTILIZATION
ROUTE

TO MEET
SHIP'S COSTS

TO MEET
SYSTEW S COSTS·

ESTIMATED
CURRENT RATE

N. America/N. Europe

160

320

1.000

N. America/Mediterranean

260

520

1,200

N. America/Mideast

362

724

1.500

N. Europe/Mi deast

222

444

1.000

N. Europe/Far East

435

870

1.500

Far East/N. America

509

1,018

2.000

Far East/Europe

670

1,340

2,000

·Ship Costs

=~

System Costs
POTENTIAL ANNUAL EARNINGS
(Revenues - Costs, 11 Ships)

Util i zation Percentage
100%
75%
70%
65%
60%
55~~

50%
45%
40%

U.S. Doll ars

=
=
=
=

=
=
=
=
=
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486
245
195
145
100
46
-4
-54
-1l0

(~llions)

The potential annual earnings for the RWS are also
given in Table 15.

The breakeven point occurs at a load

factor of 50 percent.

Even in heavily overtonnaqed routes,

such as the Eas·tbound North Atlantic, operators are achleving
this type of load factor.

However, it must be remembered

that half of a load on an Econship is a full load for most
cf the competition.

Unless high load factors are achieved,

the economies of scale offered by Econships are virtually
eliminated.

If U.S. Lines achieves load factors qreater

than 75 percent, the high return on investments, as well as
their ability to

ndercut freight rates, would appear to

make the system unbeatable.
A final consideration is the ability of U.S. Lines to
cL0ss-subsidize from other operations not connected to RWS.
If South American trades pick up steam, the company is in a
good position to generate high revenues.

Likewise, the

established operations in both the Atlantic and Pacific trades
were making profits in 1984, and some· of these revenues are
destined to be invested in the RWS.

~t

present, the RWS

appears to be marginal in economic terms.

The system

has

the potential to be a major force; and, if high enough load
factors can be reached, the competition may have to match
the investment to continue to compete.

Events in the years 1986

and 1987 will prove which scenario is accurate.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION

The great number of intangible factors involved in
analyzing the possible effects of protectionism in shipping
renders the ability to make projections virtually impossible.
Equally frustrating is the attempt to predict the success or
failure of a policy which has yet to be used.

The bottom

line is that protectionism will increase, despite any policy
the United States pursues.
The RWS meets this protectionism threat head-on.

The

system must have access to crosstrade cargoes, even if they
are merely hauled a short distance.

Slot utilization, not

unit costs, will be the dominant factor which determines the
success or failure of the RWS.

The marginal nature of the

system has already been established; thus, any loss of carqo
from non-commercial means spells trouble for

u.s.

Lines.

A recent forecast states the G.N.P. of the United States
will increase by only 4 percent in 1985, as compared to an
increase of 6.8 percent in 1984 (Magnier, 1985).

In contrast

to the world fleet, the outlook is bleak for all operators.
The question of who survives may be dependent upon financial
support, rather than superior management or equipment.
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In view of this, it appears that U.S. Lines has overextended
themselves in their substantial investment in the RWS, and
ac~uisition

of Delta Lines .

Although the level of government

backing which Evergreen Lines received is not known, it can be
safely said that, unless the bottom falls out of the market,
Evergreen will remain in business .
other

~;ovei.·nment

The same is true for the

con t r o l Le d lines, as well as the cornrnu n Ls t

bloc fleets capturing cargo on certain routes.

The conference

lines are cooperating more , due to the threllt of independent
lines.

Another occuring trend is rationalization agreements

between de ve l o p Lng nations, and commercial lines in developed
nations.
U.S. Lines is competing with lines not

necessaril~

having

to show a profit, and conferences which may soon be fighting
for their survival.

This comes at a time when the company has

a substantial amount of debts. and
lean years.

ma~

havH to endure a few

The system does not lend itself to rationalization.

except through feeder services.
Although it is growing , protectionism is not an immediate
problem .

The

U~CTAD

Code has legitimized the concerns of the

developing nations; however, it does not seem to be the instrument tel c r e a t e c a r go - s h a r i ng schemes nationwide .

At pr esent,

the real threat is the possible rise in bilateralism and commerc ial imped imen t s , wh i ch cou Id mean a loss
Far Eastern cargoes for U.S. Lines.

0

f

.' ) l )l l

thern As i an and

U.S. Linps' options for

non-U.S. trade in Latin America are already Limited.
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The U.S. Government has supported the development of the
RWS, and will continue to support the line in gaining free
access to cargoes.

With the European nations and certain Far

Eastern nations, the United States should be able to maintain
reasonably free trades.

Access to closed conferences may con-

tinue to present problems; however, it is believed that U.S.
Lines prefers to remain an outsider as long as they are able to
maintain reasonable load factors.

The greatest loss of cargo

directly resulting from protectionism is intraregional cargoes
in Latin America and the Far East.

In Europe/Far East trades,

and vice a versa, competition will be the prevalent factor, not
protectionism.
Projecting future developments in the shipping industry is
a precarious task.

The attempt here has been to outline problems,

and consider potential impacts upon a new shipping service.

In

the long run, protectionism may be a key factor in the success or
failure of the RWS.

However, the system faces pressing problems,

and the performance of the market is of overriding concern.
The revenues desperately needed by U.S. Lines may be provided by the eastbound Pacific leg.

A load factor of approxiately

75 percent on this leg would ensure ship's cost are met for a
voyage.

Thus, the line haul service can provide for itself. The

system costs

~re

more vexing, requiring U.S. Lines make strategic

decisions concerning feeder services, inland transport. and dealings with shippers.

Two key elements will be successful marketing

in the United States, and cooperation with foreign nationals.
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As of the present time U.S.

~ines

has not made a major

advertising push in trade journals and magazines.

Behind

the scenes, however, the company is most likely very busy
gearing up for the full scale introduction of the RWS.

A

major advantage that U.S. Lines enjoys versus Evergreen is
a home market which is the largest in the world whereas Evergreen has a fairly small home market which is showing signs
of slowing down.

The Evergreen RWS is thus even more depen-

dent upon crosstrades , and more vulnerable to protectionist
impediments.
In the foreign sphere -i t

is obvious that U.S. Lines must

develop good relations with foreign governments and shipping
interests.

This could be achieved by cooperative training

and information exchange programs.

As barter trade grows in

importance, shipping companies may well need some kind of inside line to gain cargoes which are subject to barter agreements.

The solutions to protectionism seem to be in commer-

cial actions, rather than government intervention.

In severe

cases the FMC may well playa major role, but linkages undermine government effectiveness despite the strong wording of
13(b)(5) of the 1984 Shipping Act.

Another impediment to

government effectiveness is the protectionist pressures being
exerted from with the United States itself.

It would be diffi-

cult to forcefully oppose protectionism internationally at a
time when it is growing in strength domestically.
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In summary, protectionism is not a key element in the
success or failure of the RWS, but, rather it is a· threat to
the long term.

However, it is believed that proper behaviour

by the company, along with prudent policy enforcement by the
FMC, will allow U.S. Lines to develop the RWS on a commercial
basis.

The success or failure of the RWS will depend upon its

performance in the first three or four years.

The economies

of the system, as well as the world market, will determine if
Malcolm McLean's dream will come true.
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